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The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for
service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the
global application of Landpower.
The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our
nation’s history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical
thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of
Landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act as a
“think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic
level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate on
ground forces’ role in achieving national security objectives.
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.
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The Center for Strategic Leadership develops senior
leaders and supports the strategic needs of the Army
by educating senior military and civilian leaders on
Landpower at the operational and strategic levels,
developing expert knowledge and solutions for the
operating and generating force, and conducting research
activities, strategic exercises, and strategic communication.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by
serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the
analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to
support the US Army, educate an international audience,
and honor soldiers—past and present.
The Army Strategic Education Program executes General
Officer professional military education for the entire
population of Army General Officers across the total force
and provides assessments to keep senior leaders informed
and to support programmatic change through evidencebased decision making.
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“The Army’s Think Tank”

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the US Army’s institute for geostrategic and
national security research and analysis. SSI conducts global geostrategic research and
analysis that creates and advances knowledge to influence solutions for national security
problems facing the Army and the nation. SSI serves as a valuable source of ideas,
criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses as well as a venue to expose
external audiences to the US Army’s contributions to the nation.
• Identify, develop, and promulgate key national security issues;
• Analyze critical issues and publish findings and recommendations to inform Army,
Department of Defense, and national leadership of strategic options;
• Act as a bridge to the broader international community of security scholars
and practitioners
SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military officers, and a
professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided
into two components: the Strategic Research and Analysis Department focuses on global,
transregional, and functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation,
and the Strategic Engagement Program creates and sustains partnerships with the
global strategic community. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of
partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in
the field of security and military strategy. In most years, about half of SSI’s publications
are written by these external partners.

Research Focus Arenas
•

Geostrategic net assessement – regional and transregional threat
analysis, sources of adversary compound threat conduct, commercial
cooperation and interoperability between partner, allied, IA, and
Joint organizations;

• Geostrategic forecasting – geopolitics, geoeconomics, technological
development, and disruption and innovation;
• Applied strategic art – warfare and warfighting functions, mastery
of joint and multinational campaigning, and spectrum of conflict
(“all things” war and peace); and
• Industrial/enterprise management, leadership, and innovation –
ethics and the profession, organizational culture, effectiveness,
transformational change, talent development and management, and
force mobilization and modernizaton (“all things” readiness).
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FOREWORD
Twenty years ago, a team of scholars and
practitioners came together to address a major
challenge: Officers in the US Army were questioning
whether the Army was a profession. The combination
of a rapid post–Cold War drawdown, increased global
operations, the war on terrorism, and an ongoing
Army transformation contributed to uncertainty in
the Army’s identity. The research team addressed this
challenge with two important volumes: The Future of
the Army Profession, first and second editions, which
analyzed these problems and provided tools for leader
development. Since these editions were published,
requirements for stewarding the profession have
become embedded in professional military education.
Today, the US military profession faces new
challenges, such as the renewal of great-power
strategic competition, the impact of lengthy and costly
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the changing
character of war (particularly with the advent of
advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence,
drone, space, and cyberspace capabilities), recurrent
crises of sexual harassment and assault, the aftermath
of a global pandemic and associated social and
political unrest that followed, and growing societal
distrust toward professions in general. Although
the work of the original Future of the Army Profession
project remains relevant, these challenges represent
new problems that need to be addressed and require
new tools to help officers continue to serve as
professional stewards.
In this monograph, Richard A. Lacqement Jr. and
Thomas P. Galvin revisit the original project and call
for a new research effort that will be more inclusive
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of the whole defense enterprise. The authors propose
questions raised previously, such as whether a Joint
profession should exist, are more important now
than before and argue the questions should be asked
of defense agencies as well. Moreover, the earlier
project focused more on defining the profession and
the professional identities of its members. The authors
suggest putting more emphasis on exploring the work
and responsibilities of the professions and the reasons
for the divisions of labor.
The times are changing. As stewards of the
profession, US military stakeholders should reflect
on how the profession should change in kind. This
monograph is a first step in this direction.

DR. CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph argues the US military profession
needs to be clearer and more precise about its
expertise and jurisdictions of practice on behalf of
US society. “Military” is a vague term that too often
is fraught with assumptions. Such assumptions,
often unstated, are a frequent source of friction in
civil-military relations. In the Future of the Army
Profession project, which published a first edition in
2002 and a second edition in 2005, Don M. Snider,
Gayle L. Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews led a large
team of researchers and analysts, drawing heavily
from Andrew Abbott’s classic work The System of
Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor,
to develop valuable insights for the US Army. One
of this monograph’s authors, Richard Lacquement,
contributed to the second edition (2005).
This monograph builds on the work of Snider et al.
by expanding analysis to the US military profession as
a whole and addressing contemporary challenges. The
monograph also considers Étienne Wenger’s work on
communities of practice as a valuable complement
to Abbott’s sociological foundation. Conceptually,
the approach the authors lay out improves on
well-known and oft-cited, yet dated, intellectual
foundations, resting on the work of Samuel
Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960).
The aim is two-fold. The first aim is to represent
the professional work of militaries more effectively
and to investigate how militaries divide this work into
different organizational structures, such as defense
enterprise (that is, fourth-estate) organizations,
the Joint community, services, and communities
within the services. This examination produces an
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architecture of jurisdictional claims over how the
enterprise is managed and which responsibilities
the profession decides to perform organically versus
outsourcing them. The examination also allows for the
analysis of duties and responsibilities among military
members, civilians, and former members, such as
veterans and retirees.
The second aim is to propose a research agenda that
builds upon this framework and examines the impact
of contemporary issues on the military profession
and its responsibilities to sustain its domains of
knowledge and ensure continued public trust. This
concern is practical because the findings should
assist civilian and military leaders in adapting to the
changing character of war, emergence of new security
threats, and evolution of old security threats as well as
articulating the military profession’s relationship with
nonmilitary professions more effectively. Achieving
this clarity is a shared responsibility defined through
negotiation with US society and its civilian leaders.
The human competition at the heart of war and
other instrumental uses of violence or coercion
requires effective discretionary judgments across
many domains. Clarification of military expertise
and jurisdictions of practice will help to prepare
US military professionals to exercise discretionary
judgment more effectively.

viii

FRAMING THE FUTURE OF THE
US MILITARY PROFESSION
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The US military profession is not well understood,
neither within itself nor among the society it serves. Too
often the term “the military” is used as if to convey some
precise meaning. But the term does no such thing. This
ambiguity contributes to a host of major problems, such
as misuse of the profession and its constituent elements;
misallocation of national resources; unremitting civilmilitary tensions; recurring crises of misconduct and
unprofessional behaviors; and, worst of all, lack of
strategic success. The core issue is a lack of clarity
about the profession’s essence or character—its expert
knowledge, its human expertise, and the jurisdictions
of practice it should occupy to best serve the American
people. At the same time, society’s trust in the military
is at risk, most notably as a result of recurrent scandals,
such as sexual harassment and assault, the withdrawal
from Afghanistan, and other strategic failures that have
many critics raising questions about the competence
and accountability of the US armed forces.1
We believe now is a good time to build on prior
research efforts to advance a new study on the US
military profession. We must go beyond the analysis
1. Thomas Spoehr, “Improving America’s Long-Term
Military
Recruiting
Outlook,”
Heritage
Foundation,
October 5, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report
/improving-americas-long-term-military-recruiting
-outlook; and Robin Wright, “Afghanistan and the Haunting
Questions of Blame,” New Yorker, September 30, 2021,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment
/afghanistan-and-the-haunting-questions-of-blame.
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of the US Army profession that Don M. Snider et al.
conducted in the Future of the Army Profession (FAP)
project and analyze the US military profession as
a whole.2 Snider and his colleagues conducted the
FAP project at a watershed moment that was just
as important as the current one. The turn of the
twenty-first century and the beginnings of the war on
terrorism presented several challenges to the Army’s
professional identity. At the time, the Army lacked a
clear definition, and the FAP helped provide one. We
aim to lead a project that will provide a clear definition
of the US military profession today as it confronts
severe and urgent difficulties of the current era.
The contemporary environment—with its external
challenges such as the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic and the return of great-power
competition as well as internal ones of diminishing
resources and a long period of sustained, high
operational tempo—has simultaneously reinforced the
FAP’s findings and raised new questions about what the
defense enterprise does and is expected to do and how
the military profession nests within it.
For this monograph and the extensive follow-on
project we propose, the central question is: What
should the US military profession’s role on behalf of
US society be in the future? The answer to this question
should permit us, first, to better articulate what the
military profession is and what it should do and,
second, to ground the US military profession and its
behavior in healthy relationships among many other
2. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, eds., The Future of
the Army Profession (New York: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom
Publishing, 2002); and Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews,
eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill Education, 2005).

2

professions and nonprofessional organizations that
serve US society (including, for example, nonmilitary,
national-security-related diplomatic, intelligence, and
economic professions).
We seek to chart a way forward for Americans—
military and civilian—to understand, evaluate, and
direct their armed forces to meet societal needs.
Our research and analysis situate the US military
within a system of professions that serve US society.
Though we acknowledge unique and indispensable
aspects of the military’s professional responsibilities,
we also recognize the normal and generally healthy
competition among the military and other professions
to meet society’s goals.
At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic, natural
and man-made disasters, and domestic security
events have highlighted how the military does not
(and never did) act alone in meeting its professional
responsibilities. The military leads national efforts in
performing some professional tasks while performing
other tasks in collaboration with and support of
other professions’ efforts. As such, the public sector
environment tempers the arena of professional
competition, resulting in the competition for resources
and prestige, while also cooperating and collaborating.
To better serve US society, an updated analysis of
the US military as a distinct profession is needed.
Such an analysis is merely part of the routine
responsibility to reassess a profession’s health and
relevance. But several contemporary challenges
command urgency for such an analysis now, including:
•

the changing character of war (including the
significance of new domains, such as space and
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•

•

•
•

cyberspace, that are underpinned by advanced
technology);
an expansive view of the applicability of military
capabilities (which may result in overmilitarization
of US foreign policy and the use of the armed forces
in circumstances in which civilian expertise and
capabilities might be more appropriate);
a lack of strategic effectiveness in recent conflicts
(for example, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War,
the Libya Revolt of 2011, and the Syrian Civil War),
despite strong operational and tactical performance;
pressures on the military to adapt and conform to
emerging societal norms in areas such as diversity
and inclusion;
risks of politicization of the armed forces; and growing
societal rejection of professionalism, which has
accelerated since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.3

3. Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition:
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, R43838 (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, updated October 7,
2021); Robert M. Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (July/August 2020):
121–32; M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2015), 175–85; Kristy N.
Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity in the
Armed Services: Background and Issues for Congress, R44321
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017);
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Increasingly Dangerous
Politicization of the US Military,” War on the Rocks, June 18, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-increasingly
-dangerous-politicization-of-the-u-s-military/; Andrew Exum,
“The Dangerous Politicization of the Military,” Atlantic, July 24, 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the
-danger-of-turning-the-us-military-into-a-political
-actor/534624/; and Michael Ollove, “The Pandemic Has
Devastated the Mental Health of Public Health Workers,” Stateline
(blog), August 5, 2021, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research
-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/08/05/the-pandemic-has
-devastated-the-mental-health-of-public-health-workers.
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This monograph therefore sounds a clarion call for
scholars and practitioners to renew examination of the
military profession. We will examine the background
of the original FAP project, describe contemporary
challenges and associated areas of research, and
develop a framework for analysis that expands on the
original FAP framework.
BACKGROUND
The development and control of military power
to serve a society’s interests is a recurring challenge
of human history. For the United States, the history
of military subordination to society’s larger goals is a
success story. But the story is not simple. The story is
one of idiosyncratic pluralism reflecting US affinity for
divided and shared powers that underpin advantageous
but often frustrating checks and balances. The story is
one of US armed forces that have been largely effective
in meeting both functional and societal imperatives
for security—that is, attaining national security from
violent external and internal adversaries (the functional
imperative) without compromising US norms of
democratic governance under civilian control (the
societal imperative). The story is also one of enormous
frictions and recurring intellectual clashes about how
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to govern military responsibilities within the broader
context of US politics.4
The structure and management of the US military
has evolved in the organizational form of departments
(Departments of War, Navy, Defense, the Army, and
the Air Force), services (US Army, US Navy, US Marine
Corps, US Air Force, and US Space Force), and commands
positioned across the globe (regional Combatant
Commands, US Special Operations Command, field
agencies, task forces, etc.). Laws, policies, doctrine, and
other guidance have evolved to establish expectations
for the responsibilities of military organizations.
For this research project, the authors use the current
Department of Defense (DoD) organizational structures
4. Important, foundational civil-military relations treatments
include Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and ed. Samuel B. Griffith
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964); and Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, trans. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). For US civilmilitary relations, critical foundations include the US Constitution
and Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay’s The
Federalist Papers, which are supported by a vast literature of
excellent scholarship, including Samuel Huntington, The Soldier
and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957);
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press,
1960); Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and
Leadership in Wartime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012); Peter
Feaver, Armed Servants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2009); Mackubin T. Owens, US Civil-Military Relations after
9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (London: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2011); and Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The
Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America,
1783–1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975). More recent works
worthy of consideration include Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider,
eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a
New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Kori
Schake and James Mattis, Warriors and Citizens: American Views of
Our Military (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016); and
Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks, and Daniel Maurer, Reconsidering
American Civil-Military Relations: The Military, Society, Politics, and
Modern War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).
6

and guidance to illustrate how the military applies
its professional knowledge to contemporary affairs
while recognizing that such structures and guidance
are outcomes of past civil-military negotiations that
are subject to revision—indeed, in many cases, these
outcomes should be revised.
The leaders of the US military profession, especially
commissioned officers, must provide effective
stewardship that is attentive to and consistent with the
demands of US national security and the imperatives of
US society, which is represented by its selected executive
and legislative representatives who exercise civilian
control of the military. Civilian leaders exercise control
by defining or ratifying the military expertise society
requires and establishing the associated jurisdictions of
practice within which such expertise serves the common
defense. Healthy civil-military relations flow from a
robust negotiation between society’s civilian leaders and
its military professionals that is ultimately adjudicated
by the decisions of civilian leaders.5 The accuracy with
which the military represents society influences the
trust the American people have in the military, which in
turn influences civil-military relations.
Certain exceptional and noble elements of the
military profession warrant society’s praise and
conditional deference. The ethical, disciplined use of
organized violence or coercion in support of common
defense is the US military profession’s highest
responsibility to the republic. Characteristics of healthy
professions include having a unique and unifying
professional identity; possessing and continuing to
develop expert knowledge crucial to society’s needs;
5. Owens, US Civil-Military Relations; and Cohen, Supreme
Command.
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building and leading organizations—including
bureaucratic structures—that apply the profession’s
expertise to specific problems; establishing, monitoring,
and enforcing a professional ethos of selfless service
and trustworthiness; providing stewardship for the
development of future professionals; and responsibly
employing society’s resources (including people,
funding, and time). An additional characteristic of a
healthy public sector profession—a class to which the
military belongs—is the sustainment of the trustand
confidence of both government leaders and the
general population.
The placement of the military profession within
a broader, competitive system of professions has
external and internal components. These components
are external in that the instrumental use of organized
violence or coercion could be avoided by “work” that
better falls within the purview of society’s nonmilitary
professions or other instruments of government.
These components are internal in that the military
profession is comprised of constituent elements that
compete with each other to serve the country’s interests
in circumstances for which organized violence or
coercion are needed. The military has an additional
internal dimension, that of the individual professional—
soldier, sailor, airman, marine, guardian, or civilian—
who is a public servant upholding an oath to support
and defend the Constitution through selfless service.
The character of competition the military undertakes
is therefore not about dominating nonmilitary or
military professions; rather, it is about continuous
self-improvement and transformation. As such, the
profession must be postured with the right capabilities
and capacity to dominate other militaries on current and
future battlefields.
8

THE ORIGINAL PROJECT (2002 AND 2005)
The turn of the twenty-first century was an eventful
time for the US military. The 1990s began with the end
of the Cold War and decisive victory in the Persian Gulf
War, but some harsh realities followed these triumphs.
The quest for a national peace dividend and the
resultant drawdown of forces, the rise of the Internet,
claims of a coming revolution in military affairs, and
the growing demands of Jointness under the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 were among these harsh realities.6 The United
States conducted a range of operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo that differed
greatly in character from the conventional wars the
military had traditionally prepared for—an experience
that would recur after the 9/11 attacks and the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed. These strategic
realities contributed to concerns about the identity of
the US military profession and the risk it would devolve
into an obedient bureaucracy.7
The original FAP project tackled this problem
through numerous studies and workshops that focused
on important questions: To what extent was the Army a
profession, what did being an Army professional mean,
and why was Army professionalism vital to the national
defense?8 The tremendous work by the FAP scholars
and the statements and actions of military leaders
following the publication of the FAP have reaffirmed
6. Frederick M. Franks Jr., “Foreword,” in Snider and
Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, xi–xiv.
7. Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, “In Their Own
Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession,” in Snider and
Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 77.
8. Franks, “Foreword.”
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commitments to the military’s professional character.
But professionalism is about more than the identity of
the profession.
Professionalism also concerns what professionals
do, how they do it, and why. What should the military
profession do organically, and what should be
outsourced or done in collaboration with others? How
well is the profession performing its assigned tasks,
and how does one know? To what extent does society
trust the military, and to what extent does the military
abide by societal norms and expectations without
jeopardizing mission accomplishment?
Andrew Abbott’s award-winning work The
System of Professions presents a holistic framework
for analyzing professions and provides a series of
convincing case studies demonstrating professional
competition in action.9 Using this framework, the FAP
derived four broad categories of Army professional
expertise: military-technical, human development,
moral-ethical, and political-cultural.10 These categories
translated into jurisdictions of practice that defined
the Army profession’s valid activities.11 For the Army,
such activities were many and varied and could be
categorized under external jurisdictions (for example,
major combat operations, cooperative security,
deterrence, irregular warfare, stability operations,
and homeland defense and civil support) and internal

9. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on
the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988).
10. Don M. Snider, “The US Army as a Profession,” in
Snider and Matthews, Future of the Army Profession, 11–12.
11 Abbott, System of Professions, 20.
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jurisdictions (developing expert knowledge
developing professionals with expertise).12

and

GAPS IN THE ORIGINAL PROJECT
Although FAP authors and scholars employed
Abbott’s constructs of professionalization and
jurisdictions, they devoted less attention to Abbott’s
construct of professional work and competitions within
professions, such as competitions among branches,
communities, functional areas, or other groups of
military professionals.13 Authors who contributed to the
FAP took the view bureaucracy was necessary for the
military to operate in the public sector, but bureaucracies
naturally worked in tension with their corresponding
professions.14 Abbott, in the first FAP edition, essentially
concurred the Army faced competing pressures trying
to balance being both a profession and an organization.15
The necessary aspects of bureaucracy were not explored,
leaving unresolved how professional work should lead
to more effective or efficient acquisition and distribution
of resources for the US armed forces.
The FAP’s nearly exclusive focus on the Army’s
professionalism constitutes another important gap. The
FAP listed three “professions”—ground, aerospace, and
maritime—but did not explore professionalism in the
12. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Joint Concepts,” JCS, n.d.,
https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Concepts/Joint
-Concepts/; and Snider, “US Army as a Profession,” 20.
13. Thomas A. Kolditz et al., “Three Case Studies on the
Army’s Internal Jurisdictions,” in Snider and Watkins, Future of
the Army Profession, 459–504.
14. Snider, “US Army as a Profession,” 13–14.
15. Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of
Professions,” in Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession,
523–36.
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other services.16 Meanwhile, the FAP did not analyze
the defense enterprise—composed of the military
services plus the service and defense secretariats,
Joint and defense agencies, defense activities, and
other defense institutions—as part of the professional
ecology. Interservice relationships represent only one
source of competition within the defense enterprise;
others include Joint-service, defense-service, and
intraservice (for example, within components, within
conventional or special operations forces, or among
branches or communities). Yet, the need for collaboration
to perform some activities, such as defense budgeting,
influences how these entities compete among
themselves and against other government activities
seeking federal resources.
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
The current urgency for a large-scale analytical
effort is underscored by recent events that raise
questions about the state of military professionalism
and the armed forces’ contract with society. The
twenty-first century has been eventful. The turn of
its third decade was tumultuous. With the return of
great-power strategic competition came a global
pandemic that disrupted communities and lives,
accentuated long-standing political tensions, and
strained the nation’s fiscal resources. The emergence
of new technologies and domains of warfare, the
evolution of adversarial capabilities, and the heightened
demands for ensuring the military’s representation of
society have placed enormous pressures on the force.
The following sections discuss challenges that have
16. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “Introduction,” in
Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 6.
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emerged since the FAP and that the military profession
now faces. A recurrent theme across all challenges is
how they affect what the military is expected to do and,
therefore, what expert knowledge the military requires
(or, in many cases, shares with other professions) to
perform these tasks.
The Changing Character of War
The return to great-power competition is described
in the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America, which declares, “Inter-state
strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary
concern in US national security.”17 But the character
of war has shifted away from symmetric, force-onforce forms of warfare to more asymmetric varieties.18
Examples include gray-zone operations by Russia in
Ukraine and efforts by China to occupy and control
territory in the South China Sea with an armed reserve
force.19 The advent of cell-phone technologies and
the spread of social media provide unprecedented
capabilities to capture and disseminate instantaneously
information about ongoing military actions to a global
audience. Consequently, individual tactical activities
are placed under intense and immediate scrutiny,

17. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, 2018), 1.
18. Douglas J. Feith and Shaul Chorev, The Evolving Nature of
War, Information Series, no. 458 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute
for Public Policy, May 6, 2020).
19. Feith and Chorey, Evolving Nature of War.
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as are their strategic leaders.20 Drones and other
unmanned systems are ubiquitous features of the
battlefield that provide capabilities to conduct lethal
strikes on adversaries from an extended distance, thus
raising questions about their legality under the laws
of armed conflict.21 Yet, these developments have been
accompanied by a growing risk aversion to harming
civilians. Incidents of harm have delegitimized military
action in the eyes of many civilian observers, even
when the scope of such action has been within the
bounds of laws of armed conflict and established rules
of engagement.22
Cyberspace provides an example of how the changes
in the character of warfare are affecting what militaries
do and how they do it. Cyberspace as a domain of
human activity is a relatively recent phenomenon, but
it is now an indelible part of the strategic environment,
with global, state, and nonstate actors continuously
engaging in efforts to steal proprietary information,
disrupt normal operations, and sow fear and distrust in
democratic institutions.23 As US society grapples with
20. Debasis Dash, “Facing a Future with Organized
Weaponization of Social Media,” War Room, May 31, 2019,
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/organized
-weaponization-of-social-media/.
21. Ryan J. Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed
Conflict,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 39, no. 1
(January 2011): 101–38.
22. Alcides Eduardo dos Reis Peron and Rafael de Brito
Dias, “‘No Boots on the Ground’: Reflections on the US Drone
Campaign through Virtuous War and STS Theories,” Contexto
Internacional 40, no. 1 (January/April 2018): 53–71.
23. Mari K. Eder, “Information Apocalypse, Part III:
The War on Reality,” War Room, April 3, 2019, https://
warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/information
-apocalypse-war-on-reality/.
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the relevance of cyberspace, new military commands
have been created, and personnel specialties have been
designated (including both uniformed and civilian
billets within the DoD).24 Activities in the cyberspace
domain have profound implications for national
security, but what makes such activities military? Does
the military have a peculiar expertise in the cyberspace
domain, or, as with some predominantly civilian
professions (for example, medical and legal), should
such expertise be integrated into the existing armed
forces in a supporting role?
These questions also highlight the important roles
of the defense enterprise in developing, generating,
and integrating requisite military capabilities to
be available for US combatant commanders while
ensuring the integration of such capabilities elsewhere in
the US government. The cyberspace domain challenges
many traditional notions of what constitutes overmatch
or sufficiency and what providing trained and ready
forces means. For example, do three cyber warriors
triple the capacity of a single one? (Short answer: No.)
If the success of a particular military operation
depends on the capabilities of the nonmilitary portion
of cyber, how is the nonmilitary portion integrated
into a measure of readiness? To what extent must the
24. Keith B. Alexander, “Building a New Command in
Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer
2011): 3–12; David Ruderman, “Command Establishes Enlisted
Pathways to Become a Cyber Operations Specialist,” US
Army, June 10, 2015, https://www.army.mil/article/149776
/command_establishes_enlisted_pathways_to_become_a
_cyber_operations_specialist; and Jason Miller, “To Keep
Cyber Workers, Army Opens Up Its Wallet,” Federal News
Network, January 28, 2020, https://federalnewsnetwork.com
/reporters-notebook-jason-miller/2020/01/to-keep-cyber
-workers-army-opens-up-its-wallet/.
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military depend on the cyberspace profession writ large
for the certification of its cyber warriors? What does
rank mean in cyberspace organizations (and is it even
relevant)? These questions highlight the difficulties the
defense enterprise faces in resourcing (that is, providing
funding, personnel, facilities and infrastructure, and
time) its slice of the cyber force while appropriately,
equitably, and fairly resourcing other capabilities.
More generally, the changing character of war
raises important questions: What are appropriate
jurisdictions for the military on future battlefields based
on the emerging changes to the character of war? For
the jurisdictions deemed to belong elsewhere, what is
the appropriate relationship between the military and
other professions?
Applying Force for Nonmilitary Purposes
Part of the impetus behind the FAP was the growing
concern over the effects of military operations other than
war, defined as operations below the level of interstate
conflict, on the military profession. In examining
operations in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Thomas L. McNaugher presented the military as being
required to develop and sustain different domains of
expert knowledge, skills, and competencies for peace
enforcement and peacekeeping. He expressed concerns
over the deleterious effects on overall readiness for
conventional warfare.25 As combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan evolved into stability operations,
the extent to which the military should have been
organized, trained, and equipped for operations across
25. Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army in Operations Other
Than War: Expanding Professional Jurisdiction,” in Snider and
Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 155–78.

16

the conflict continuum received even greater attention.26
But, though the debate over the extent to which the
military should conduct nonconventional warfare
remains intense, less controversial was the expectation
the military should have been prepared for anything
that arose across the conflict continuum.
This expectation may no longer apply. In addition
to changes in the character of warfare, the character
of national responses to emergencies has changed.
With this change has come increased demands for
use of the military in homeland security matters and
foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Critics and military professionals have considered the
appropriateness of using the military to secure the US
southern border; quell civil discord (for example, in the
US Capitol attack of 2021); and respond to wildfires,
hurricanes, and the COVID-19 pandemic because these
actions may detract from the military’s preparation for
conventional war.27 Also, though the military has long
engaged in training missions for partner militaries,
the quantity and extent of such missions has increased
because of the perception uniformed military are
preferred over civilian contractors (for example, private
security companies) procured via the Department
26. Nathan Jennings, Amos Fox, and Adam Taliaferro, “The
US Army Is Wrong on Future War,” Modern War Institute,
December 18, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/us-army-wrong
-future-war/; and JCS, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0
(Washington, DC: JCS, updated January 17, 2017), V-4.  
27. Todd South, “Wildfires, Civil Unrest, Hurricanes, a
Pandemic, Combat Prep—The Army Guard Had a Busy Year,”
Defense News, October 13, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com
/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2020/10/13/wildfires-civil-unrest
-hurricanes-a-pandemic-combat-prep-the-army-guard-had-a
-busy-year/.
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of State.28 The Army therefore has dedicated force
structure to these missions by creating six Security
Force Assistance Brigades.29
These security assistance operations are no longer
seen as one-off events; rather, they are seen as a
pattern of enduring changes in expectations for the US
armed forces and debates surrounding such endeavors.
The FAP included research on the militarization of
foreign policy and the possible breakdown of the
civil-military discourse following the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.30 Militarization of foreign policy also
emerged as a point of contention during the creation
of United States Africa Command in 2007, seen by
some in diplomatic circles as a power grab by the
Department of Defense.31 This perception reflects
long-standing tensions over the use of hard versus
soft power, with soft power being associated with
nonmilitary activities (for example, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief) that might detract from
the military’s readiness and its fighting spirit and raises
questions for the profession, such as, What happens to
the profession as the military absorbs—willingly or
28. Jefferson P. Marquis et al., Developing an Army Strategy
for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 204.
29. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army
Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and
Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper, no. 1 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
March 16, 2021), 25.
30. Marybeth P. Ulrich, “Infusing Normative Civil-Military
Relations Norms in the Officer Corps,” in Snider and Matthews,
Future of the Army Profession, 655–82.
31. Edward Marks, “Why USAFRICOM?,” Joint Force
Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 148–51; and Mary C. Yates, “US
Africa Command: Value Added,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st
Quarter 2009): 152–55.
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not—and normalizes these additional requirements?
To what extent does the continuous negotiation among
national and military leaders result in beneficial
or detrimental changes to the responsibilities and
jurisdictions of the military profession?
Strategic Ineffectiveness
The relationship between tactical and strategic
success has always been tenuous, as the US experience in
the Vietnam War demonstrated. The famous exchange
between American and Vietnamese officers in Harry
Summers’s book, On Strategy, captures this well: “‘You
know you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said
the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel
pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be so,’ he
replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.’”32
Generally, military historians and scholars have
lamented the disconnect between tactical and strategic
efforts, resulting in winning battles but losing wars
or winning wars yet losing the peace.33 Critics have
accused both civilian and military leaders of failing
the armed forces by limiting the aims of war to
minimize national commitments, refusing to provide
adequate forces to meet stated objectives, and shackling
32. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam
War in Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College Press, 1981), quoted in James M. Dubik,
“Winning Battles, Losing Wars,” Institute for the Study of
War, December 2, 2014, https://www.understandingwar.org
/backgrounder/winning-battles-losing-wars.
33. Bing West, “How We Fight in the Twenty-First
Century: Winning Battles while Losing Wars,” Hoover
Institution, December 10, 2015, https://www.hoover.org
/research/how-we-fight-twenty-first-century-winning-battles
-while-losing-wars.
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commanders with unnecessary or counterproductive
rules of engagement.34
When failures such as the US withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 2021 occur, assigning blame and
painting current or former national and military
leaders as incompetent and culpable outside the
results of a credible, independent investigation is
understandable. But the military has been ineffective
in recent operations in which military professionals:
(1) employed forces too small to accomplish the
stated objectives; (2) had to exercise force surges to
preclude operational or strategic failure; (3) presided
over operations that failed to achieve the political
objectives; or (4) failed to confront their civilian leaders
when their policies and commitments of resources did
not satisfy the objectives.35 The last item in the list is
troublesome and has a long history in the United
States. In his book Dereliction of Duty, then-Major
H. R. McMaster highlighted the failure of Vietnam-era
military leaders to speak truth to power rather than
carry out flawed policies.36 Similar charges have been
leveled against twenty-first-century military leaders
who, during operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
34. West, “How We Fight”; and Peter R. Mansoor,
“Why America Can’t Win Its Wars,” Hoover Institution,
December 10, 2015, https://www.hoover.org/research/why
-america-cant-win-its-wars.
35. Mark Moyar, “The White House’s Seven Deadly Errors,”
Hoover Institution, December 10, 2015, https://www.hoover
.org/research/white-houses-seven-deadly-errors.
36. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam
(Boston: HarperCollins, 1998); and Thomas J. Umberg, “We
Depend on Our Military to Speak Truth to Power,” Voice
of OC, December 8, 2020, https://voiceofoc.org/2017/03
/umberg-we-depend-on-our-military-to-speak-truth-to-power/.
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global war on terrorism, failed to challenge policies
that arguably led to unnecessary loss or misuse of
blood and treasure.37
Forensic analysis of the 2021 Afghanistan
withdrawal or any other conflict may not produce
clearanswers as to the reason a given operation has
succeeded or failed, but successes and failures alike
require a reexamination of the definition of strategic and
military effectiveness. Strategic success for the United
States, as was experienced in the Persian Gulf War and
the invasion of Panama, is often attributed to clear goals,
domestic and international support, overwhelming
force, and clear end states that preclude enduring
commitments afterward.38 But even if the policy is
right (however it may be judged), suitable military
strategy still must be developed to serve policy. The
development of such strategy may include identifying
and clarifying (hopefully with the support of civilian
leaders) the aspects of the policy that are imperfect or
the limitations of military means in contributing to
desired policy outcomes. Members of the military bear
responsibility for translating military capabilities and
limitations for the benefit of their civilian counterparts.
Effective translation requires skills and knowledge
associated with strategic and operational art.39
37. Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces
Journal 144, no. 10 (May 2007): 16–25.
38. Alan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “Lessons of
War,” National Interest 14 (Winter 1988–89): 83–95; and
Samuel Helfont, “The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed
Opportunities, and the Post–Cold War Order Undone,”
Texas National Security Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 26–47.
39. Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting
National Strategy: A Theory of Success,” Joint Force Quarterly 97
(2nd Quarter 2020): 55–64.
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The preservation of expert knowledge of military
strategy has been largely vested in the institutions
of professional military education (PME) and
institutions that develop and promulgate concepts
and doctrine. These institutions, including the
war colleges, have faced their own criticisms for
failing to develop strategists.40 On the PME side,
concerns include the watering down of strategy
education in favor of other requirements; the balance
(and contributions) of military, retired military,
and pure civilian faculty; and the overall rigor of
PME experiences.41 The question being raised is,
To what extent do the military’s institutions support
the appropriate development, use, and retention of
the professional domain of expert knowledge vital to
the profession?
Social Pressures on the Profession
Continued efforts to satisfy the societal imperative
of having the armed forces sufficiently represent the
society they serve have seen mixed results since the

40. Robert Scales, “Slightly ‘Steamed,’ Gen. Scales Explains
His Criticisms of the Military’s War Colleges,” Best Defense (blog),
May 11, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/11/slightly
-steamed-gen-scales-explains-his-criticism-of-the-militarys-war
-colleges/.
41. Richard B. Andres, “The Other Side of the Air War
College Story: Some Profs Avoid Researching or Teaching about
Our Current Wars,” Best Defense (blog), April 19, 2011, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/19/the-other-side-of-the-air-war
-college-story-some-profs-avoid-researching-or-teaching-about
-our-current-wars/.
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FAP.42 On the plus side, several important changes
have been made that reflect the enduring realities of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fading of clearly
defined front lines and the subsequent diffusion of
the combat environment have provided a justification
for fully integrating women into the combat arms.43
Systematic efforts to confront and remove unconscious
bias in selections and promotions, such as the removal
of official photographs, have been arguably successful
in bringing about fairer results.44 The honorable and
heroic service performed by lesbian, gay, and bisexual
servicemembers has helped break down the cultural
barriers against their service and bring about the
repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell law.
Failures have occurred as well. President Barack
Obama’s repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 2011, did
not initially include other sexual minorities, such as
transgender people, whose inclusion or exclusion
became the subject of competing policy stances by

42. Suzanne Nielsen, “American Civil-Military Relations
Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s
The Soldier and the State,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012):
369–76.
43. Emma Moore, “Women in Combat: Five-Year Status
Update,” Center for a New American Security, March 31, 2020,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/women-in
-combat-five-year-status-update.
44. Jason M. Payne and Francine Chapman, “Talent
Identification: Centralized Promotions in the Blind,” NCO Journal,
July 13, 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals
/NCO-Journal/Archives/2020/July/Talent-Identification/.
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different administrations in the late 2010s.45 Transgender
status remains controversial. The military has faced
numerous sexual harassment and assault scandals,
most notably in the early 2010s. More troublesome
has been the unprofessional attitudes expressed by
some servicemembers dismissing the impact of the
scandal.46 And despite the efforts to be more inclusive of
minorities, flag or general officers and senior civilians
remain overwhelmingly white and male, indicative of
the often glacial pace of change in a profession.
The changing mores of US society have induced
renewed dialogue about how military professionals
balance societal and functional imperatives. For
example, critics have charged the military is
overemphasizing diversity and inclusion goals at the
expense of readiness, while others counter readiness
and diversity are naturally complementary, such that
a more diverse force would be more trustworthy and,

45. Joe Biden, “Statement by President Joe Biden on
the Tenth Anniversary of the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,” White House Briefing Room, September 20, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements
-releases/2021/09/20/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-the
-tenth-anniversary-of-the-repeal-of-dont-ask-dont-tell/; and Jo
Yurcaba, “Biden Recognizes the 10th Anniversary of ‘Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell’ Repeal,” NBC News, September 20, 2021, https://
www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/biden-recognizes-10th
-anniversary-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-rcna2086.
46. Don M. Snider, “The Army’s Campaign against Sexual
Violence: Dealing with the Careerist Bystanders,” Strategic
Studies Institute, July 11, 2013, https://ssi.armywarcollege
.edu/2013/pubs/article/the-armys-campaign-against-sexual
-violence-dealing-with-the-careerist-bystanders/.
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therefore, effective.47 Another question is, What falls
within the responsibilities of the profession, and what
is best left to other professions? For example, to what
extent do matters of sexual harassment and assault
exceed a commander’s capacity, thereby necessitating
the involvement of external actors for prosecuting cases
or addressing the needs of victims?48
The general questions posed are: What is the
proper division of professional responsibilities between
commanders and the enterprise? What determines
the shifting of responsibilities from one to the other?
To what extent can the enterprise and commanders
synthesize the functional and social imperatives and
adequately respond when the imperatives fall out
of balance?
Politicization
The 2020 presidential election and its aftermath
highlighted the importance of military professionals
remaining nonpartisan and outside the political
process.49 Actions by serving and former professionals
have raised the specter of the military becoming
47. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, “Protecting,
Not Just Reflecting Society,” Military Review May 2018 Online
Exclusive Article, May 3, 2018, https://www.armyupress.army
.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE
/Apr/Protecting/.
48. Jim Garamone, “Leaders Discuss Initial Sex Assault
Review Commission Recommendation,” Department of Defense
(DoD), May 7, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News
-Stories/Article/Article/2600363/leaders-discuss-initial-sex
-assault-review-commission-recommendation/.
49. Melody Barnes, “Not a Normal Transition,” Election 2020
and Its Aftermath (blog), November 17, 2020, https://millercenter
.org/election-2020-and-its-aftermath.
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politicized, which for a profession represents the
compromising of objectivity and the use of the
profession to serve political aims.50 Both 2020
presidential campaigns claimed legitimacy on the basis
of numerous open endorsements by retired flag officers,
some of whom spoke at the national conventions of the
Republican and Democratic parties.51 In 2021, dozens
of military veterans, two reservists, one active-duty
servicemember, and two National Guard members have
been arrested for participating in the US Capitol attack.52
Though these overt actions have been decried as
damaging to the military profession, other troubling
signs of a more covert nature have appeared. For
example, Heidi A. Urben indicates military members
50. Paul R. Pillar, “The Perils of Politicization,” in Loch K.
Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).
51. Heidi A. Urben, “Generals Shouldn’t Be Welcome at
These Parties: Stopping Retired Flag Officer Endorsements,” War
on the Rocks, July 27, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07
/generals-shouldnt-be-welcome-at-these-parties-stopping
-retired-flag-officer-endorsements/.
52. Patricia Kime, “Active-Duty Troops Who Participated
in the Capitol Siege Could Face These Penalties,” Military.com,
January 21, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021
/01/12/active-duty-troops-who-participated-capitol-siege
-could-face-these-penalties.html; Claire Hymes, “What We Know
about the ‘Unprecedented’ Capitol Riot Arrests,” CBS News,
August 11, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-capitol
-riot-arrests-latest/; Ben Leonard, “First Known Active-Duty
Military Member Is Charged in Jan. 6 Insurrection,” Politico,
May 13, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/13
/marine-charged-capitol-insurrection-488113; and Alex Horton,
“Soldier with ‘Hitler Mustache’ Is First to Be Thrown
Out of Military after Capitol Riot Charges,” Washington
Post,
October
20,
2021,
https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national-security/2021/10/20/capitol-riot-timothy
-hale-cusanelli/.
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are increasingly favoring public criticism of political
leaders on social media.53 Ronald R. Krebs and Robert
Ralston found civilians are increasingly ignorant of
traditional civil-military norms and their importance
for a functioning democracy.54 On the other hand,
one of the traditional concerns, partisan bias in the
military, appears to be fading. Marybeth P. Ulrich
illustrates in the 1990s, soldiers who self-identified as
conservatives vastly outnumbered self-identifying
liberals 23 to one, and indications emerged the officer
corps was “Republicanizing”—aligning very strongly
with conservative views or openly rejecting politically
liberal views.55 Arguably, due to greater numbers of
millennials in the force and the retirement of 1990s-era
officers, the partisan gap has narrowed to less than two
to one conservative to liberal.56
Another concern is the civilian politicization
of the military, meaning the use of the military—
including its heritage, equipment, resources, or
53. Heidi A. Urben, Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of the
Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the World of Social Media (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 2017).
54. Ronald R. Krebs and Robert Ralston, “Too Many
Americans Don’t Subscribe to a Basic Tenet of Democracy,”
Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs
.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-14/civilian-control
-military-partisan-issue.
55. Ulrich, “Civil-Military Relations Norms,” 666–69.
56. Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Popularity Slips in Latest Military
Times Poll—and More Troops Say They’ll Vote for Biden,” Military
Times, August 31, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news
/pentagon-congress/2020/08/31/as-trumps-popularity-slips
-in-latest-military-times-poll-more-troops-say-theyll-vote-for
-biden/; and Tara Copp, “Can Trump Count on the Military to
Vote Republican in 2020? Millennials Bring Shift,” McClatchy
DC Bureau, October 31, 2020, https://www.mcclatchydc.com
/news/politics-government/election/article246835432.html.
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servicemembers—specifically for partisan purposes.57
The late 2010s saw this effect put into practice, with
the military being used increasingly as “backdrops for
blatantly political speeches” or being assigned missions
that would be more appropriate for law enforcement
or state agencies.58 Though military leaders and
commentators alike have issued strict policy guidance
reinforcing proper civil-military norms, officers have
been generally averse to discussing partisan politics
with their subordinates.59
This guidance is clearly correct, but is it enough?
The simple approach has been for military members
to say or write less and less and for the military’s
public affairs, legislative affairs, and other formal
communication channels to exercise more caution.
The better approach, however, may be for the military
to encourage more open communication that is
mindful of civil-military norms.60 After all, though
the military profession must eschew partisanship,
the military is an inherently political entity due to
both its status as a public-sector organization and its
prominence as a symbol of both national strength
and democratic ideals. The question that arises
is how best to sustain open communication with
stakeholders (including “speaking truth to power”),
the public, servicemembers, civilians, military
57. Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking
Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security
44, no. 4 (2020): 7–44.
58. Barno
and
Bensahel,
“Increasingly
Dangerous
Politicization.”
59. Jim Golby and Mara Karlin, “The Case for Rethinking
Politicization of the Military,” Task & Purpose, June 12, 2020,
https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/us-military-politics
-politicization/.
60. Golby and Karlin, “Case for Rethinking.”
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partners, and others with the understanding that open
communication naturally carries risks.61
Growing Repudiation of Professionalism
The challenges discussed thus far represent, at least
in part, self-inflicted problems brought about by the
actions or inaction of military professionals. But more
troubling signs that professionalism in general is under
increasing attack from society have appeared. Teachers
and other educational professionals have long objected
to patterns of mistreatment by parents, significantly
reduced resources, and poor pay and benefits, leading
to frustration and discord.62 Medical professionals and
insurance companies have long clashed over treatment
plans and cost controls for patients.63
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this
phenomenon of rejecting expertise. The profession
of public health, part of the profession of medicine,
has been weakened as segments of society have
prioritized the sustainment of local economies or
individual civil liberties over concerns of unchecked
spreading of the virus.64 The profession of law
enforcement was also arguably weakened by several
incidents of police violence in the summer of 2020 that
highlighted inequitable treatment of minorities by
61. Umberg, “We Depend on Our Military.”
62. Robert Bruno, “When Did the US Stop Seeing Teachers
as Professionals?,” Harvard Business Review, June 20, 2018, https://
hbr.org/2018/06/when-did-the-u-s-stop-seeing-teachers-as
-professionals.
63. Murali Poduval, “Medicine as a Corporate Enterprise:
A Welcome Step?,” Mens Sana Monographs 6, no. 1 (2008): 157–74.
64. Rene Loewenson et al., “Reclaiming Comprehensive
Public Health,” British Medical Journal Global Health 5, no. 9
(September 2020).
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police.65 Members of the medical profession have been
frustrated by individuals’ lack of compliance or refusal
to comply with preventative measures, which arguably
contributed to the spike in cases during the summer of
2021. These professions and others have seen worrying
exoduses of members who have faced harassment and
threats or become overly stressed and disenchanted
due to the unnecessary and avoidable prolongment of
the pandemic.66
To what extent does the military face such pressures?
Mark G. Kappelmann notes the growing intrusion
of legislative and executive actions into military
professional affairs is a sign of a profession in decline.67
Budget constraints resulting from the Budget Control
Act of 2011 and, more recently, the concerns over the
costs of COVID-19 relief packages are potentially
65. Deepshikha Chatterjee and Ann Marie Ryan, “Is Policing
Becoming a Tainted Profession? Media, Public Perceptions, and
Implications,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 41, no. 7 (September
2020): 606–21; Heather MacDonald, The War on Cops: How the
New Attack on Law and Order Makes Everyone Less Safe (New York:
Encounter Books, 2017); and David S. Kirk and Marti Rovira, “An
Audit Experiment to Investigate the ‘War on Cops’: A Research
Note,” Journal of Experimental Criminology, March 18, 2021, https://
link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11292-021-09458-x.pdf.
66. For example, Sasha Pezenik and Laura Romero, “Major
Exodus of Public Health Professionals during Pandemic,” ABC
News, February 5, 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/US/major
-exodus-public-health-officials-pandemic/story?id=75679880;
Leandra Bernstein, “‘Why Stay?’: Law Enforcement Advocates
Explain Exodus from Police Forces,” ABC News4, July 7, 2021,
https://abcnews4.com/news/nation-world/why-stay-law
-enforcement-advocates-explain-exodus-from-police-forces;
and University of York, “Teacher Burnout Causing Exodus
from the Profession,” Phys.org, July 22, 2021, https://phys.org
/news/2021-07-teacher-burnout-exodus.html.
67. Mark G. Kappelmann, The End of the American Military
Profession (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2017).
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impacting military readiness and modernization
efforts.68 Even moral support from the public may not
translate meaningfully into real support for sustaining
a ready military. Signs indicate the public is detaching
itself from the military profession, thanking veterans
for their service but otherwise not providing active
support for national preparation for war.69 This
phenomenon raises several important questions about
the possible weakening of professionalism in general
and how it may impact the military: To what extent
and under what conditions does society respect and
abide by expert knowledge, trust professions, or
acknowledge professionalism?
THE NEED FOR A NEW PROJECT
Flowing from this analysis, the authors propose
a larger project to map a way forward to practical
outcomes. Three important outcomes stand out in
particular. First and foremost is providing an accessible
way for American citizens and their uniformed servants
to understand the US military as an instrument for
common defense—including their understanding of
the changing character of war. Second is providing
civilian leaders who serve in the executive and
68. Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead, Providing for the
Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the
National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: National
Defense Strategy Commission, 2018), 49–50; and Diane DiEuliis
and Laura Junor, “Ready or Not: Regaining Military Readiness
during COVID-19,”Institute for National Security Studies,
April 10, 2010, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article
/2145282/ready-or-not-regaining-military-readiness-during
-covid19/.
69. Risa Brooks, “Beyond Huntington: US Military
Professionalism Today,” Parameters 51, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 72.
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legislative branches of the US government a useful
framework for engaging, developing, and governing
the US military profession. Third is improving
how US military leaders serve as stewards of the
military profession. The project should inform military
professional development and support healthier
civil-military relations. In an important way,
metaphorically, the project could yield a useful
“owner’s manual” of the US armed forces for
the American public as well as its civilian and
military leaders.
To put this discussion in perspective, for all
its vaunted capabilities and acumen, the military
profession addresses only a fraction of society’s needs.
To be expert in the military profession’s demanding
fields of knowledge and the jurisdictions within which
such knowledge is applied requires an economy of
effort toward, or maybe functional ignorance of, other
areas that make up society’s ecology of expertise. The
US military profession is a collection of subordinate
professions (land, maritime, air, space, and cyber) that
vie among each other and with other nonmilitary,
national-security-related professions (for example,
intelligence, economic, and diplomatic professions) to
meet society’s needs. The provisional autonomy of the
military reflects a division of expert labor that helps US
society thrive. The military profession, as important
as it is, is merely one among many indispensable
public service professions—such as medicine, law,
the judiciary, law enforcement, education, business,
media, and engineering—that deserve critical analysis,
assessment, negotiation, and adjudication as US society
pursues “a more perfect union,” “provides[s] for the
common defense,” and better “promote[s] the general
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welfare.”70 Constitutional requirements, institutional
abilities, ethical factors, and practical considerations
appropriately vest civilians with the ultimate authority
with which to adjudicate the military’s contributions.
Importantly, this analysis does not begin with
idealized constructs of military professionalism. The
analysis starts with where the US military is now.
We take the current or existing construct of services
and organizations as the baseline provided to us by
generations of US civil-military bargaining. Similarly,
we accept current doctrine and policy as the results of
implicit and explicit bargaining. To describe and explain
the current state of the US military is not an abdication
to inertia. Rather, description and explanation provide
a firm foundation from which we can predict future
implications of previous bargains and prescribe
modifications when we discern better ways to meet
society’s needs.
Context matters too. The balance between current
operations and future plans is often a function of how
US society perceives the urgency and acuity of the
threats at a particular moment in time. Even in the
most extreme emergencies, however, the imbalance
of attention to immediate versus future threats rarely
results in focusing on only one set of threats and not
the other.
Though our focus is on the US military, we
recognize other countries’ experiences and bargains
can yield valuable lessons (and our analysis may yield
valuable lessons for our counterparts in other countries).
Nevertheless, we bound our present analysis to focus
on the US civil-military bargain, especially because
many developing countries, since the end of the
70.

Preamble to the United States Constitution.
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Cold War, have followed Western models of military
organization and civil-military relations and adapted
them to suit their national security interests and
available resources.71 For example, whereas most
countries have an army, fewer have separate air forces,
marine forces, or navies, and many navies serve only
the role of coastal defense.72 Separate space and cyber
forces are emerging and growing in numbers.73
Drawing on the second edition of the FAP, we
propose the core expertise of American military officers
is as follows: “The peculiar skill of the [American]
military officer is the development, operation, and
leadership of a human organization—a profession—
whose primary expertise is the application of coercive
force on behalf of the American people.”74 Our effort
in this monograph and in the follow-on project we
propose is to refine this general definition of US military
expertise and apply it to the US military profession.
71. Thomas S. Szayna, East European Military Reform after the
Cold War: Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1995), 17.
72. Jonathan Masters, “Sea Power: The US Navy and
Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 19, 2019,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sea-power-us-navy-and
-foreign-policy.
73. Matthew Donovan, “Unleashing the Power of Space:
The Case for a Separate Space Force,” War on the Rocks,
August 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/unleashing
-the-power-of-space-the-case-for-a-separate-u-s-space-force/;
and Jason Blessing, “The Global Spread of Cyber Forces,
2000–2018,” in Tat’ána Jančárková et al., eds., Going Viral: 13th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (Tallinn, EE: NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2021), 233–55.
74. Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional
Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” in Snider and
Matthews, Future of the Army Profession, 215.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The intended result of the authors’ analysis is
a map of the US military profession defined by its
expertise and jurisdictions of practice. Developing an
understanding of the military profession entails several
complex elements. The elements of complexity include
grappling with the following central research question:
What should the US military profession’s role on behalf
of US society be in the future?
Pursuing the answers to this question should inform
research efforts oriented on contemporary and future
challenges. These answers should also guide systemic
changes to the ways leaders exercise stewardship over
the military profession. The US military profession is
embedded within a vast organizational structure that
includes a significant bureaucracy. A major tension for
professions is to ensure bureaucratic structures and
processes serve society and not the other way around.
The professionalism and important role of reserve
components (National Guard and federal reserve forces)
add complications.
Also important is the extent to which new
professions are emerging or should emerge. For example,
cyberspace is one of the newest warfighting domains
and one that does not readily fit within the existing
professions of ground, maritime, and aerospace.75
Our analysis should help to clarify what constitutes
distinctly military expertise in the cyberspace domain;
75. Michael P. Kreuzer, “Cyberspace Is an Analogy, Not
a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for
the Information Age,” Strategy Bridge, July 8, 2021, https://
thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/8/cyberspace-is
-an-analogy-not-a-domain-rethinking-domains-and-layers-of
-warfare-for-the-information-age.
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the nature of and responsibility for the professional
development of individuals with the appropriate
expertise; and the areas of work (jurisdictions) subject
to full, shared, subordinate, or some other jurisdictional
claim. Our approach could include insights into
whether the cyber domain warrants the creation of
a separate military service, as is currently the case for
the other four domains—that is, whether the potential
for offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace
warrants the designation of cyber as a warfighting
domain. Given the unique aspects of cyberspace
(a wholly human-created domain, unlike the other
four physical domains) and its potential capacity
to compel others to do our will (a quintessential
characteristic of war), a specialized organization or
military service governed by distinct professional
expertise might be warranted.
The following supporting questions constitute
potential updates to the original FAP findings.
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is the military profession?
What is the profession’s expertise?
What are the profession’s jurisdictions of practice?
How should the military profession’s leaders
provide appropriate stewardship in negotiation (or
in conjunction) with its civilian masters?
How should civilian and military leaders employ
the profession and its capabilities (organizations,
people, equipment, etc.)?
How should civilian and military leaders sustain,
grow, and adapt the profession for the future?
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A PROPOSED REVISED FRAMEWORK
The remainder of this monograph initiates the
conversation by presenting proposals for revisions
to three frameworks presented in the FAP. The first is
a proposed expansion of the sociological framework
used in the FAP based on Abbott’s The System of
Professions. This expansion includes the addition of
Abbott’s construct of professional work, which will
help with modeling what military professionals are
expected to do and what barriers will get in the way.
The expansion also adds Étienne Wenger’s construct
of communities of practice, which enhances Abbott’s
framework by including considerations for when and
why professions collaborate as well as compete. This
enhanced framework will support research efforts
toward a stronger understanding of which components
of the defense enterprise are professionalized or should
be professionalized and which may not need to be. The
enhanced framework will also enhance deliberations
about how to prepare military and civilian leaders to
steward the profession.
The next section will present a framework for
modeling the various challenges, contemporary and
enduring, the military profession faces. This framework
will support greater understanding of how, when,
and why the military profession may fail or how
military professionalism may be eroded. This greater
understanding will in turn help leaders differentiate the
unhelpful, rhetorical use of the term “failure” from the
objective analysis and identification of the improper or
incomplete application of military capabilities toward
national security problems.
Finally, the authors will examine contemporary
areas of expertise and jurisdictional claims for
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negotiation with civilian leaders. The scope of this
examination, which has been greatly expanded from
that of the FAP, will involve the full defense enterprise
and the ground, maritime, and aerospace components
within it. In addition, the authors will examine one
of the most important facets of their analysis: the
relationship between bureaucracy and profession
across the US military, from the defense enterprise
level down to the major communities of practice that
provide administration and support vital to the services’
mission accomplishment.
PROPOSED EXPANDED SOCIOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORK
The FAP’s primary emphasis was on affirming
the identities of the military profession and its
professionals: servicemembers and defense civilians.
For this reason, the FAP used as its primary sociological
framework Abbott’s The System of Professions.
Researchers who participated in the FAP drew several
constructs from Abbott to explain the challenges
and opportunities of the military profession at the
turn of the twenty-first century. In reviewing the
history of professions and the professions literature,
Abbott argued professionalization—how professions
form and uniquely establish their places in society—is
a function of the work to be performed that others are
unfit or unable to do.76 Leonard Wong and Douglas V.
Johnson II’s telling of the Army profession’s history
aligns with this model, but not necessarily in a positive
way. These authors summarized the early Army’s
responsibilities as merely doing what no other civilian
76.

Abbott, System of Professions, 3–25.

38

institution could or would.77 The professionalization
of the Army emerged from this vague demand, such
that the Army postured itself to perform whatever task
required trained personnel ready to perform under
austere conditions.78
The Army profession would subsequently transform
as a result of significant changes to its tasks, such as
the evolution from performing constabulary duties
before the world wars to governing Germany and Japan
between World War II and the Korean War.79 Just as
Abbott theorized, other trappings of professionalism
emerged as needed or desired, rather than through
a central, discernable plan, including professional
education institutions (for example, the United States
Military Academy at West Point), journals (for example,
ARMOR magazine, which began as The Cavalry Journal
in 1888), and associations (for example, the West Point
Association of Graduates, formed in 1869).80
Perhaps the most useful of Abbott’s constructs were
jurisdictions and jurisdictional claims, which made
their way into several chapters of both FAP editions. In
the first edition, jurisdictions were described in James
Burk’s chapter as the domains of expert knowledge

77. Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Serving the
American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession,” in
Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 59–76.
78. Wong and Johnson, “Serving the American People,” 62.
79. Wong and Johnson, “Serving the American People,” 66.
80. “The Cavalry & Armor Journal,” The Cavalry and Armor
Journal, n.d., https://cavalryandarmor.com/journal/; and
“West Point AOG,” West Point Association of Graduates, n.d.,
https://www.westpointaog.org/history-of-west-point-aog.
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employed.81 By the second edition, multiple authors
settled on four such jurisdictions applying across the
entire Army—military-technical, human development,
political-cultural, and moral-ethical.82 Jurisdictional
claims, according to Abbott, amounted to efforts to
compete for, secure, and dominate particular domains
of expert knowledge, and such claims were dynamic.83
Thus, FAP authors examined new or emerging
jurisdictions the military could or should claim or
current jurisdictions the military could possibly forfeit.84
Interprofessional competition, as found in The
System of Professions, was Abbott’s other construct
used in the FAP. Snider discussed how, during the
post–Cold War era, the Army found itself defending
its jurisdictional claims against the other services,
private contractors, and other governmental and
nongovernmental actors.85 Snider and Jeffrey Peterson
also examined the slow adaptation of Jointness
81. James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy
of the Military Profession,” in Snider and Watkins, Future of the
Army Profession, 23; and James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and
Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in Snider and Matthews,
Future of the Army Profession, 39–60.
82. Snider, “US Army as a Profession”; and Lacquement,
“Army Professional Expertise.”
83. Abbott, System of Professions, 42.
84. Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement,
“A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and
Reconstruction,” in Snider and Matthews, Future of the Army
Profession, 251–70; Deborah Avant, “Losing Control of the
Profession through Outsourcing?,” in Snider and Watkins, Future
of the Army Profession, 271–90; and Elizabeth Stanley and G. F.
Deimel, “The Digital Battlefield: Transformation Efforts and the
Army’s Future Professional Jurisdictions,” in Snider and Watkins,
Future of the Army Profession, 293–324.
85. Snider, “US Army as a Profession,” 3.
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mandated under the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
proposed a new Joint profession.86
But these constructs were not the only ones Abbott
developed. Overlooked were his examinations of what
professionals do, how they do it, and why through
his construct of professional work.87 Also overlooked
were internal competitions within professions, such as
between branches, communities, functional areas, or
other groups of military professionals. By introducing
these constructs, we will advance an understanding
of professionalism through its application of expert
knowledge and how it sustains that knowledge.
The result is a framework for more accurately
capturing the complicated nature of the hundreds of
formal and informal subgroups within the military
profession—what Wenger refers to as “communities of
practice.”88 Wenger’s communities of practice explain
the interrelationships of the various subgroups (for
example, active and reserve components) and cohorts
(for example, officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians)
in the profession better than the construct used in the
current professionalism literature.
Professional Work
Abbott presents the construct of jurisdictional claims
as the way professions stake out their exclusive right
to perform certain high-skilled or highly intellectual
86. Don M. Snider and Jeffrey Peterson, “Opportunity for
the Army: Defense Transformation and a New Joint Military
Profession,” in Snider and Matthews, Future of the Army Profession,
237–50.
87. Abbott, System of Professions, 35–58.
88. Étienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning,
Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
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tasks.89 Competition among professions involves efforts
to manifest their claims in two ways. One is by securing
access to particular clients—what Abbott calls “client
differentiation.”90 The other is by distinguishing and
controlling tasks only the given profession performs.
Abbott identifies five ways professions distinguish
and control tasks; we will refer to them collectively
as “task differentiation.”91 The military profession
differentiates in both ways via dual monopoly because
it only has one client—the nation—and it performs a
task no other entity within the nation performs—it
conducts war.92 Of course, war is a broad and vague
term and requires elaboration. One of us (Lacquement)
explains the Army’s jurisdictional claims over major
combat and other military operations.93 But these
top-level claims break down into smaller claims that
represent specific expert knowledge, such as maneuver,
fires, communications, logistics, engineering, military
police and rear operations, and many others. Each of
these domains represents discrete yet interdependent
areas of expert knowledge that also constitute distinct
groups of experts (for example, career fields or military
occupational specialties) within a military. These groups
are rarely interchangeable; one would not ordinarily
substitute logistics experts with signal experts or light
infantry experts with armor experts. These groups
effectively compete with each other and stake their own
89. Abbott, System of Professions, 59–68.
90. Abbott, System of Professions, 77.
91. Abbott, System of Professions, 69–76.
92. Thomas P. Galvin, “What Is the Defense Enterprise?”
in Defense Management: Primer for Senior Leaders, ed. Thomas P.
Galvin (Carlisle, PA: School of Strategic Landpower, US Army
War College Press, 2018), 24.
93. Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise.”
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jurisdictional claims. In essence, these groups act like
professions within a profession.
According to Abbott, professional work is what
professionals do that distinguishes them from other
types of workers and other professionals.94 The
components of professional work define the profession
and posture it for success in competition with other
professions. Professional work comprises five elements:
(1) performing the required tasks; (2) defining problems
through diagnosis; (3) correcting the problems via
treatment; (4) connecting diagnosis and treatment
through inference; and (5) developing and sustaining
abstract knowledge to be shared within the community.95
Applying these elements to the whole profession, as the
FAP does, is straightforward. But, as will be shown,
these elements also explain intraprofessional claims of
jurisdiction promoted by subgroups. Some subgroups
represent vertical divisions in the structure, such as the
Army’s branches and functional areas. Others represent
lateral networks that extend across the enterprise, such
as the G-1 (personnel and talent management) and G-8
(resource management and comptroller) communities.
Tasks
What a profession does can be fluid. Consider the
evolution of cavalry. Cavalry began as soldiers fighting
on horseback and evolved as medieval knights began
wearing armor; however, they eventually became
vulnerable to gunpowder weapons. Armored vehicles
eventually replaced horses. Though the essential
tasks of cavalry remained conceptually unchanged—
scouting, reconnaissance, screening, and exercising
94.
95.

Abbott, System of Professions, 35.
Abbott, System of Professions, 35–58.
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great mobility—the work of the cavalry and its
relationship with the infantry changed throughout
its history, especially as a result of the introduction of
new technologies. Thus, expectations for cavalry have
evolved significantly.
Abbott notes how such tasks can emerge and
disappear through objective and subjective factors
in the problem space.96 Objective factors stem from
tangible sources. First, new technologies beget
requirements for new expert knowledge. Like the
advent of the tank, the Army’s Big Five weapon systems
ushered in active defense and, later, the AirLand Battle
doctrine used in the Persian Gulf War.97 Another
example is military medicine, which has embraced
the development of advanced prosthetics that replace
lost limbs and restore the quality of life for patients.98
Also, new organizational and societal constructs may
create or resolve novel problem areas in ways that elude
experts. For example, in the case of the US Space Force,
the growing importance of the space domain led to the
creation of a whole military organization structure to
harness the military’s space-related expert knowledge.
Though the tasks of space-lift operations and
ballistic missile monitoring were not new, the task of

96. Abbott, System of Professions, 37–42.
97. David C. Trybula, “Big Five” Lessons for Today and
Tomorrow (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2012); and John L.
Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development
of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 1984).
98. Wendie A. Howland, ed., “Advances in Amputation,”
special issue, Journal of Nurse Life Care Planning 20, no. 2
(Spring 2020).
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“[m]aintain[ing] space superiority” emerged as other
global powers expanded their space capabilities.99
Subjective factors derive from societal and
organizational culture and can enable or constrain the
tasks a profession performs. These factors are prevalent
within militaries because they prefer to avoid gaps
or overlaps when dividing their labor internally to
minimize confusion and reduce risk to mission. One
subjective factor in militaries is task differentiation by
levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.
The traditional strategic focus of the professionalism
discourse puts civil-military relations at the center, but
it also includes the defense enterprise context and how
a service translates requirements and resources into
capabilities to support the warfighter with assistance
from the defense industrial base.
Tasks at this level include communication with
civilian stakeholders (for example, military advice),
service-level strategies and plans, and the strategic
conduct of war. Tasks at the operational and tactical
levels of war are different; however, the expert
knowledge used to perform them overlaps to a degree
with that of strategic tasks. Operational tasks include
the development of courses of action to achieve military
objectives and the dissemination of plans as orders
to units.
Tactical tasks include those that translate the orders
into action in a complex, dynamic battlefield. The expert

99. DoD, Defense Space Strategy Summary (Washington, DC:
DoD, 2020).

45

knowledge required to perform strategic tasks builds
on operational and tactical experience.100
Military concepts and doctrine are mechanisms
used to help frame professional tasks. For example,
Joint concepts are examinations of the ever-changing
national security environment to diagnose and infer
potential military roles and requirements.101 Joint
Publication 1 establishes an architecture of treatments,
identifying six broad classifications of military
activities to exercise everything from major combat to
security cooperation and deterrence, which, in turn,
drives capability development.102 Therefore, military
professionals have the responsibility to develop and
sustain these capabilities and determine which are most
appropriate for a given emerging challenge.
A second subjective factor is rank and status, which
differentiate officers, civilians, and enlisted personnel
and influence the professional tasks they perform.
Rank and status correlate with the level of war among
tasks performed in many combat and combat support
specialties (for example, lower rank as tactical and
higher rank as strategic).103 Rank also correlates with the
echelon of the organization performing or managing
the work (for example, lower-level units perform
more tactical work and higher-level commands and
100. HQDA, Army Leadership and the Profession, Army
Doctrinal Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019),
4-1–4-5.
101. James L. Cook, “The Importance of Joint Concepts for
the Planner,” Joint Force Quarterly 99 (4th Quarter 2020): 95–100.
102. JCS, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1
(Washington, DC: JCS, July 12, 2017), I-10–I-12.
103. Troy V. Mumford, Michael A. Campion, and Frederick P.
Morgeson, “The Leadership Skills Strataplex: Leadership Skill
Requirements across Organizational Levels,” Leadership Quarterly
18, no. 2 (2007): 154–66.
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staffs perform operational and strategic work). Status
differences between military personnel and civilians
have closed for professional work, particularly in
technical specialties in which the duties of military
members and civilians are more interchangeable.
Examples of duties becoming more interchangeable
abound in acquisition, planning, training, and other
enterprise tasks.104
Diagnosis, Treatment, and Inference
Diagnosis and treatment are the visible
manifestations of professional work. According to
Abbott, diagnosis is a mediating act that injects
“information into the professional knowledge system
and treatment brings instructions back out from it.”105
Though this is a medical metaphor, it applies to all
professions. Lawyers diagnose a client’s needs and
render legal advice. Educators diagnose the needs
of the students in comparison to the curriculum and
implement classroom (or remote) activities to address
the needs. Militaries diagnose the security needs
of their nations and develop strategies, plans, and
programs to meet them.
The hidden core of professional work is the required
inference, in which expert knowledge is used to frame
the problem such that proposed treatments become
available or clear.106 Professionals want diagnosis and
treatment to be easier to perform; as a result, they filter
out irrelevant information, especially if the problem
104. Congressional Budget Office, Replacing Military Personnel
in Support Positions with Civilian Employees, Pub. no. 51012
(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2015).
105. Abbott, System of Professions, 40.
106. Abbott, System of Professions, 41.
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is better served by another profession or vocation.107
Militaries are no exception; they prefer to frame
national security problems in ways suitable for military
solutions (for example, conventional combat forces) and
defer other problems (for example, “nation building”)
to other governmental or nongovernmental entities.108
Therefore, one indicator of the health of a profession
depends upon its ability to use inference to properly
diagnose and treat professional problems.
Signs of an obviously unhealthy profession include:
(1) misdiagnosing problems; (2) prescribing the wrong
treatments; and (3) failing to develop and sustain its
expert knowledge. These failures can harm society’s
confidence in the profession and invite competition
from other professions over claims of jurisdiction. A
profession can also be weakened through diversion,
such as when a military is asked to perform tasks that
fall outside its jurisdiction—for example, to cover gaps or
shortages of other agencies or actors. Conducting border
security, domestic operations, and other noncombat
activities consumes time, energy, and readiness the
military might prefer devoting to combat training,
for example.
Professions are also weakened when inference
becomes routine. Abbott likens professional thinking
to chess: “The opening diagnosis is often clear, perhaps
formulaic, as is the endgame of treatment. The middle
107. Abbott, System of Professions, 41–42; Carl H. Builder,
Rethinking National Security and the Role of the Military (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995); and Corri Zoli and
Nicholas J. Armstrong, “Post-9/11 Stability Operations: How US
Army Doctrine Is Shaping National Security Strategy,” PRISM 2,
no. 1 (2010): 101–20.
108. Dominic Tierney, “The Backlash against Nation
Building,” PRISM 5, no. 3 (2015): 13–27.
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game, however, relates professional knowledge, client
characteristics, and chance in ways that are often
obscure.”109 If the connections between diagnosis and
treatment are straightforward and simple to derive,
professional inference is likely not necessary, and the
process can be automated, rendering professionals
obsolete. These nonroutine instances in which inference
is critical are key.110
Abbott also explains the strength of a profession
hinges on the limited number of opportunities for
successful treatment. A doctor can be forgiven for
a couple trial-and-error diagnoses if the patient’s
condition is ambiguous, but if the patient is dying or
under severe duress, the doctor only gets one chance
to diagnose and treat.111 The analogy to the military is
obvious: Nations only realistically get one chance to
begin a war. If the nation fails in beginning the war, it
must deal with the consequences.
Abstract Knowledge
Inference is made possible by the collection,
formalization, and dissemination of abstract knowledge.
This concept is the most important in Abbott’s
construct of professional work. Abbott argues
abstract knowledge is not organized for practical
use, with the implication that conflating abstract
with practical knowledge can be dangerous. Rather,
practitioners can only develop better diagnostic,
treatment, and inferential methods through a deeply
logical and rationally consistent body of abstract
knowledge, and they must discredit and remove
109.
110.
111.

Abbott, System of Professions, 48.
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the methods that are less effective, ineffective,
or counterproductive.112
So, what is a military’s body of abstract knowledge?
In the FAP’s first edition, James Blackwell argued in
favor of doctrine, explaining how a force fights and
structures knowledge so it is reusable.113 Doctrine
helps determine future requirements of a military
force based on emerging threats and other changes
in the security environment. Some doctrine presents
enduring principles, and other aspects are temporary or
fleeting based on the best available or known tactics and
technologies of the time. But doctrine is the outcome of a
vetting process that filters out redundancies, addresses
gaps, and resolves contradictions so knowledge can be
transferred and readily reused.
This argument is counter to Abbott’s definition,
which includes the retention of all knowledge, including
the esoteric and contradictory.114 Abbott argues abstract
knowledge is disaggregated and collected through the
study of single, discrete problems. Abstract knowledge
emerges through rigorous experiments and the
continual experiences of practitioners conducting
professional work day to day. Aggregation—especially
in the form of doctrine as validated texts—produces
practical knowledge. But none of the knowledge
is purely abstract; rather, it is a “perfected abstract
knowledge system,” according to Abbott—one designed
to efficiently capture and transfer knowledge across a

112. Abbott, System of Professions, 52–54.
113. James A. Blackwell, “Professionalism and Army
Doctrine: A Losing Battle?” in Snider and Watkins, Future of the
Army Profession, 103–26.
114. Abbott, System of Professions, 55.
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profession to be shared and incorporated as appropriate
in practical settings.115
Abbott’s conception of abstract knowledge
has two implications for the military profession.
First, all military professionals have the personal
responsibility to contribute to the profession’s body
of knowledge, whether from practical experience or
through the conduct of studies, experiments, and
research supporting abstract knowledge. Similarly, all
professionals have the obligation to apply and share this
knowledge. Thus, failure to meet these obligations is
also a signal of a weak profession.116 Such signals include
when members are overwhelmed with administrative
(bureaucratic) or other nonprofessional requirements
and when members face external or internal barriers
to sharing and learning. One example is suppressing
information that contradicts an official service position
on a professional matter.117 Another example is
excessive monitoring and reporting of requirements or
other activities necessary for the enterprise to satisfy
its stakeholders because it diverts organizational
energy.118 In addition, anti-intellectualism dims
the value and effort of generating and sharing
professional knowledge.119
115. Abbott, System of Professions, 56.
116. Abbott, System of Professions, 57.
117. For example, Mike Fowler, “The Rise of the Present
Unconventional Character of War,” Strategy Bridge, November 4,
2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/11/4/the
-rise-of-the-present-unconventional-character-of-warfare.
118. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves:
Dishonesty in the Army Profession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2015).
119. Lloyd J. Matthews, “Anti-Intellectualism and the Army
Profession,” in Snider and Matthews, Future of the Army Profession,
61–92.
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The second implication is not all tasks military
members perceive as bureaucratic are necessarily so.
The act of preserving expert knowledge, including
the diagnosis of gaps in the knowledge and the
development of treatments that include rigorous study,
dialogue, experimentation, and practical resolution,
is itself professional work.120 Anti-intellectualism
contributes to the conflation of these professional tasks
with administration because they likely do not involve
tangible action or are perceived as belonging to a separate
part of the organization, such as an “experimental”
brigade (for example, the Army’s experimental MultiDomain Task Forces) or organizations like the US Army
Futures Command.
Internal Divisions of Professional Work
Another implication is the division of labor within
a profession is itself significant. Just as the military
enterprise subdivides into separate “professions” of
ground combat, maritime, and aerospace—each with
its own unique domain of expert knowledge—the
enterprise further subdivides its work among groups
of experts in more specific domains of knowledge, such
as infantry, maritime surface warfare, aviation, armor,
signal, intelligence, submarines, logistics, and others.
These groups claim specific jurisdictions, perform
professional work, and maintain their expertise. Are
these groups therefore professions unto themselves or
something else?
We argue the latter for two reasons. One, intergroup
dynamics within a service include both Abbott’s
sense of interprofessional competition and systems
of collaboration fostered by unique service identities.
120.
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These subgroups may come about through formal
subdivisions within a service, such as the branches,
specialties, and functional areas within the military.
The subgroups can also be informal networks of
professionals who share tasks or expert knowledge but
whose specified duties may differ by organization—
such as networks of trainers, planners, human resources
experts, and resource managers or comptrollers.
The second reason is membership in these
subgroups is more fluid than Abbott’s construct of
profession allows. One may be an operations officer
in one organization and a supply officer in another.
Members may have to break and forge networks as
they move and progress, whereas Abbott assumes
membership in a profession is more stable.121
Wenger’s Communities of Practice
At the same time Abbott was developing his system
of professions, other scholars, including Wenger,
were developing the construct of communities of
practice, defined as groups of individuals who sustain
the pursuit of a shared enterprise. Communities of
practice are bound together by social and situated
learning through four components.122
•
•

121.
122.

Meaning. Learning as experience that manifests
through the ways in which individuals communicate
their newfound capabilities.
Practice. Learning as doing that manifests through
the communication of shared perspectives, leading
to cooperation and mutual action.
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•

•

Community. Learning as belonging that manifests
in the validation and sustainment of structures and
norms that support cooperation and mutual action.
Identity. Learning as becoming that manifests as
the ways in which learning changes the individual
over time.

The construct of communities of practice enhances
the professional discourse because it adds boundary
spanning as an essential element of how communities
both cooperate and compete as part of a larger,
shared enterprise.123 For example, service component
commands must satisfy both the needs of the
Combatant Commands above them and the services
from which they gain resources.
The relationship between Abbott’s and Wenger’s
constructs is that the former is a subset of the latter:
Professions are types of communities of practice, but
not all communities of practice are professions.124 In
the case of militaries, adding Wenger’s communities
helps one investigate several questions about the
internal workings of military professions Abbott alone
does not adequately address. These questions are
the following.
•
•
•

123.
124.

To
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extent
do
the
organization’s
boundaries matter?
To what extent does stratification of professional
work within the military help or hinder
mission accomplishment?
How should one address the cohorts of former
members, such as veterans and retirees?
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A theme underpinning all three questions is the
important role professionals play in contributing to,
employing, and sustaining the profession’s domain of
expert knowledge. We will now show how Wenger’s
construct provides an approach for analyzing the
construct of the defense enterprise. For example, one
might ask whether the enterprise layer is an independent
profession or merely a community of practice binding
together the three professions of ground, maritime,
and aerospace.
The Organization and the Profession
In Abbott’s first-edition FAP chapter, he sought to
reconcile his construct of a profession with the military’s
conflation of organizational strength with professional
strength.125 The duality of the Army as profession and
bureaucracy influenced other FAP authors as well.
For example, Deborah Avant lamented the supposed
weakening of Army professionalism due to the
outsourcing of the training function and the presence of
private-security personnel in overseas theaters whose
functions were “hard to distinguish from defensive
ground warfare.”126 She used Abbott’s interprofessional
competition and its “contested jurisdictions” to suggest
privatization causes the military and defense firms to
be in competition with each other, which is problematic
because, at least at the time, firms paid better, provided
more benefits, and offered greater freedom to their
workers than soldiers received.127
Abbott’s view was rooted in the idea the construct
of a profession was not naturally tied to organizational
125.
126.
127.
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boundaries, and he challenged FAP members’
underlying assertions about why the Army was both
an organization and a profession at once.128 In Abbott’s
construct of professions, if a task supporting the Army’s
mission constitutes professional work, then where it is
performed matters less than how well it is performed.
Competitions among professions and organizations are
separate phenomena.129
Wenger’s boundary spanning adds an organizational
context that establishes boundaries between insourced
and outsourced activities. In some cases, the boundary
is porous, such that who performs the task matters less.
Logistics is an example of a function that is heavily
outsourced at acceptable risk to the military mission.
On the other hand, the boundary can be very firm and,
thus, outsourcing the task is risky. Outsourced trainers
are less likely to sustain currency in the military
context and are therefore potentially less successful as
trainers.130 Predicting the activities that will be most
affected by outsourcing is difficult, however. One could
use service-level jurisdictional claims and suggest
the activities be identified fully within the military
context, such as claiming activities that are inherently
governmental should be insourced, but this perspective
may only apply to communities of practice related to
combat arms. Support activities may differ.131

128. Abbott, “Army and the Theory of Professions,” 534.
129. Abbott, “Army and the Theory of Professions,” 535.
130. Lindy Heinecken, “Outsourcing Public Security: The
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Forces & Society 40, no. 4 (2014): 625–46.
131. [Redacted], Definitions of “Inherently Governmental
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The outsourcing question also applies to functions
the military is being asked to perform that may
rightfully belong to another activity or organization.
For example, militaries perform law enforcement and
security tasks, humanitarian assistance (for medical
civic action programs and the like), disaster relief,
and institution building. Whether these tasks are
performed as a result of the law, a prior agreement,
or necessity in times of crisis, professional militaries
can find themselves pressed into service because
they are known generally to be effective, dedicated,
and versatile. Militaries may also have immediately
available capacity. Being outsourced also carries risk
due to the diversion of assets and energies away from
core mission requirements, although this would not
necessarily affect all communities of practice equally.
The military medical and engineering communities
gain training and currency benefits from participating
in civil-action programs.132 Yet, questions have been
raised about whether such activities provide adequate
training benefit to the military.133
In sum, the extent to which organizational
boundaries and associated contextual differences
in professional work exist influences communities
of practice and is therefore an important area of
research. For example, how should the US military best
incorporate cyber expertise? Are cyber experts a new
military profession within a distinct domain that would
lend itself to the creation of a separate service that
132. Michael W. Wissemann, “Great (Soft) Power Competition:
US and Chinese Efforts in Global Health Engagement,” Parameters
51, no. 3 (2021): 65–77.
133. Jeff Drifmeyer and Craig Llewellyn, “Military Training
and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance,” Military Medicine 169
(January 2004): 23–29.
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would lead professional work, much like the existing
services lead professional work in the land, maritime,
and aerospace domains? Or do cyber experts represent
a community of practice (like communications or
intelligence) that cuts across the other domains and
their services?
Intraprofessional Stratification
In his case studies, Abbott examines how
professions using the same or related domains of
expert knowledge stratify themselves according to
the character of their work, their clients, and their
use of increasing or decreasing levels of abstract
knowledge. Higher-status clients and greater use
of abstract knowledge convey higher status to a
profession. In Abbott’s framework, high- and low-status
professions do not readily associate and potentially
view each other with contempt.134 A notable example
is the separation of high-profile psychotherapists and
low-profile social workers, both active in the “personal
problems” domain. The clientele of these professionals
is differentiated economically, such that the former
avoids taking on poorer clients and defers them to
social workers. Also, the way these professionals apply
expert knowledge differs, with the former having
greater control over its environments and therefore
having greater opportunities to expand its abstract
knowledge. In comparison, the latter is overloaded
with patients and, as a result, it exercises practical
knowledge almost exclusively.135
The military profession exercises stratification
as well, but, again, collaboration among and across
134.
135.
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communities of practice far outweighs internal,
competitive forces. A broad example is the familiar
distinction between “officer’s business” and “sergeant’s
business” that separates the higher-profile (higherranked) tasks of planning and collective action from the
lower-profile (yet vital) tasks of individual training and
readiness.136 Stratification also occurs among officers
because company grades perform different tasks
than field grades and flag officers. Though Abbott’s
construct would emphasize competition among these
strata, Wenger’s construct allows for viewing them as
both multiple rank-based communities and a single
community of practice that represents the whole
branch. Thus, the divisions of labor by rank and
the impacts on the quality and responsiveness of
professional work can be examined. Studies could
examine the extent to which tasks are properly aligned
at echelon, from enlisted personnel to senior officers,
or the impacts challenges experienced in transitioning
from one stratum to another have on the profession.137
Wenger’s construct also allows for a different way
to think about the civilian cohort, which the original
FAP consolidated into a single category of professionals
called “the Army Civilian Corps.”138 The tasks of most
civilian specialties overlap with tasks assigned to
the military branches, again with little impact on the
136. Donn A. Starry, “Sergeants’ Business,” in Lewis Sorley,
ed., Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 486–95.
137. Thomas P. Galvin, “A Phenomenological Study of
Identity Construction among Military Officers Promoted from
the Middle Ranks to the Roles of Senior Leaders” (PhD diss., The
George Washington University, 2015).
138. Center for the Army Profession and Leadership, Army
Profession Pamphlet (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for the Army
Profession and Leadership, 2018), 11.
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professional character of the work performed. Most of
the enterprise’s technical experts—human resources,
cyber, medicine, intelligence, finance, logistics, civil
engineering, and many others—include both military
personnel and civilians.139 Thus, considering civilians
as part of the communities of practice aligned with
their work, rather than identifying the whole of the
civilian workforce as a single, unified cohort, is more
appropriate. Research can then examine the extent
to which assigning tasks to military personnel or
to civilians affects the performance of professional
work, just as it investigates the effects of insourcing
and outsourcing.
Retirees and Veterans
The use of professional work as a binding construct
presents the status of former servicemembers—
from veterans to full retirees—in a different light.
The cohort system relegates these individuals to the
category of former professionals whose responsibilities
include acting in ways that “are not detrimental to
the effectiveness . . . of the Profession.”140 Again,
this perspective reduces the status of former
servicemembers according to their organizational
status, not their professional one. Many veterans and
retirees continue to support the military in some
way, including performing similar (if not the same)
professional tasks as they did when they served and
coaching and mentoring active-duty personnel. Instead
139. “Careers & Jobs,” GoArmy.com, updated May 11, 2017,
https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/army-civilian
-careers/in-demand-civilian-jobs.html.
140. Martin E. Dempsey, The Profession of Arms: An Army
White Paper (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 2010), 17.
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of only focusing on what these individuals cannot do,
the professionalism literature should also address what
they should be encouraged to do.141
The following discussion is a brief introduction. We
divide these former professionals into three categories
that represent common postservice career choices.
These categories are for illustration purposes and are
not comprehensive. The first category is the simplest—
former servicemembers who essentially divorce
themselves from the profession of arms. These former
members may perform similar professional work,
such as a military engineer taking a civil engineering
position, a military doctor joining the local hospital,
or another specialist leveraging his or her military
credentials in his or her second career. These former
members have truly embraced being “former”; we do
not need to consider them further.
The second category represents retirees who
continue to provide services to the military, such as
those joining the Army Civilian Corps, continuing
as reservists (that is, not immediately joining the
rolls of the Army’s Retired Reserve), or becoming a
defense contractor who directly supports a military
organization. The legal status of these retirees may
contribute to changes in the character, scope, and
quantity of the professional work performed, but not
its nature. The expert knowledge and experience are
applied directly back into the enterprise.
The third category is the most important and
controversial: former members who leverage their past
membership to influence the defense enterprise but
141. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “ ‘Cashing in’ Stars: Does
the Professional Ethic Apply in Retirement?,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 9, no. 3 (2015): 105.
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who do not work directly within it. These individuals
may have joined or started firms that provide services to
the enterprise; joined think tanks, lobbying groups, or
other organizations promoting an agenda to influence
the enterprise in some way; or participated in the media
landscape, providing influential commentary.142 These
individuals may also be consultants, informal coaches,
advisers, or mentors of serving individuals. The actions
of these individuals may ultimately be construed as
beneficial to their present organizations (or themselves,
if they are self-employed), and the knowledge and
expertise they possess are still valued commodities
from which the profession can benefit. The emphasis
uniformed leaders have placed on avoiding conflicts of
interest and actions that denigrate the profession are
justified. But without avenues for former members to
continue to make valuable contributions to professional
knowledge, they may be discouraged from doing so. The
profession of arms should not forfeit such opportunities
to capture and leverage such expertise.
Expert Knowledge
Abbott and Wenger agree expert knowledge should
be actively managed, expanded, and sustained, and this
is a central need of the profession of arms. The scope
of these responsibilities extends far beyond the role of
any segments of the enterprise dedicated to doctrine.
Rather, the scope of these responsibilities extends
to the whole of the profession and all of its members.
All professionals have an obligation to systematically
capture, develop, sustain, and share expert knowledge.
While the professional bureaucracy may provide
dedicated structures and resources to foster ideas,
142.
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develop concepts, and write doctrine to synthesize
abstract knowledge for practical use, this abstract
knowledge must be constructed through experience
and reflection.
The FAP was right to pursue the most important
question first: What is the military profession? With
this question answered, exploring what the profession
does is the next logical step. The inclusion of Wenger
helps answer this question through understanding the
complexity of the many internal domains of expert
knowledge the military applies in both operational and
garrison environments. Just as the military may not be
a profession just because it says so, it is certainly not a
profession if its actions—the conduct and sustainment
of its professional work—do not uphold its claims.143
MODELING CHALLENGES MILITARY
PROFESSIONALISM FACES
Until this point, including the FAP, we have
assumed military professionalism is inherently
good and desired or expected by society. But what
if this assumption is wrong? What if society ceases
to recognize a professional military and no longer
supports it? This question is important because of the
doubts that have been cast about professions during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The armed forces naturally seek to build trust with
the nation they serve and sustain it. The armed forces
aspire to behave honorably and lawfully in combat. Also,
despite the aforementioned challenges in implementing
diversity and inclusion, the Army and the military
embrace important national and democratic ideals,
143
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such as equality, fairness, justice, self-determination,
selfless service, etc. The military may not get everything
right, but it prefers to seek autonomy and to address its
problems internally rather than having fixes imposed
from the outside.144
The FAP identified multiple challenges to military
professionalism, but it did not provide a central
framework for analysis. This lack of a central framework
complicates the ability to provide tools for the diagnosis
and treatment of a profession’s ailments. We propose
an initial framework to differentiate particular classes
of these challenges, each reflecting different pressures
on the conduct of professional work and requiring
different remedies. Our proposed framework includes
three distinct categories of professional challenges:
(1) “unprofessionalism,” or the improper conduct of
professionals; (2) “deprofessionalism,” or the improper
use of expert knowledge; and (3) “antiprofessionalism,”
or the rejection of professionals and professionalism in
favor of alternative methods for conducting the work of
professionals. We propose each has multiple forms that
warrant further research to determine the category’s
impacts on the military profession.
Unprofessionalism: Improper Conduct
The first category, unprofessionalism, is obvious.
Unprofessionalism is when the profession or its
professionals behave in ways that undermine trust.
We suggest two forms, one being better understood
than the other. Scandal, the deliberate misconduct of
professionals who bring a profession into disrepute,
144. Thomas P. Galvin, Leading Change in Military
Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders (Carlisle, PA: School of
Strategic Landpower, US Army War College Press, 2018), 8.
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is straightforward. Professionals who make serious
personal errors in judgment harm the profession and
undermine trust. The military’s recurring sexual
harassment and assault scandals are examples of such
misconduct occurring broadly across the military.
Identifying the commission of such acts as abhorrent
and a violation of professional norms is simple.
Unfortunately, eliminating this misconduct has not
been easy. That such scandals recur despite efforts to
sanction and prevent such unprofessional behaviors
is of great concern to civilian and military leaders.145
Research into the persistence of scandal and ways to
effectively counter it could be helpful.
The other form is incompetence, which is the
demonstrated inability of professionals to apply expert
knowledge appropriately and effectively. This form is
more difficult for an enterprise to deal with because
incompetence is challenging to define and even harder
to diagnose. In his historical examination of military
incompetence, Norman F. Dixon develops an extensive
list of outcomes and describes their results, including
the unnecessary and avoidable wastage of human
resources, indecisiveness, underestimation of the
enemy, overestimation of one’s capabilities, obstinance
in one’s position despite contrary data, failures to
leverage opportunities, and others.146 Dixon also finds
these same outcomes could emerge from reasonable
decisions, and militaries may forgive the errors of some
leaders more than if the same errors were committed
by others due to personalities, individual traits, or
145. Don M. Snider, “Will Army 2025 Be a Military
Profession?,” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 49–50.
146. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military
Incompetence (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 159.

65

membership in a dominant group in the military.147
Further research could apply the Abbott construct of
professional work to facilitate the understanding of and
ultimately preclude poor decisions derived from the
misapplication of military professional knowledge.
While the remedies seem obvious, they
can be difficult to apply consistently. They are
(1) communicating to reinforce professional norms
and expectations; (2) providing reparations to those
who are harmed; and (3) removing violators from
membership. But, despite intense efforts to root out
unprofessionalism, it tends to persist or recur. Further
research could explore the potential shortcomings
of these remedies.
Deprofessionalism: Losing Control over Knowledge
We define deprofessionalism as the systematic use
of expert knowledge by nonprofessionals, such that it
erodes professional jurisdictions. We propose two forms
here: laicization and commodification.
The first is Abbott’s process of laicization, which
reflects the transfer of expertise from professionals
to the laity or ordinary citizens.148 An example of
laicization in medicine is when patients decide to
diagnose and treat themselves or others without a
doctor’s consultation. Laicization becomes problematic
when patients with access to expert medical information
decide to diagnose symptoms that should warrant
established medical attention or to administer improper
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treatments that could cause harm.149 Contemporary
information technologies, such as videos, websites,
social media, and other resources, enable laicization
because nonprofessionals can easily locate information
drawn from professional bodies of knowledge. The risks
of improper self-diagnosis and treatment are great.150
Laicization is also found at the organizational level
because professional firms may be competing against
nonprofessional firms that provide professional-like
services without the requisite expert knowledge,
skills, ethics, and certifications. Law enforcement and
the military compete with private security firms.151
Attorneys, tax professionals, accountants, and others
compete with do-it-yourself online applications, such as
free tax preparation programs.152 Teachers and others in
the education professions compete with homeschoolers,
private charter schools, and for-profit firms whose
interests, business models, or incentives may be
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misaligned with the purposes of education’s support to
democracy and democratic institutions.153
A second form of deprofessionalization is
commodification, in which the knowledge of
professionals and experts is influenced by market forces
and social pressures that interfere with the equitable
provision of professional services to all eligible members
of society.154 Professionals could become biased in
their diagnoses, inferences, and treatments. The
pharmaceutical and legal professions are particularly
vulnerable because of the economics involved, such
as the impact of prices and insurance plans on drug
treatments or law firms restricting competition to
sustain status and prestige.155
The FAP devoted several chapters to this
problem; one chapter opines the pursuit of efficiency,
predictability,
and
control
deprofessionalizes
the military and refers to this effect as the
“McDonaldization” of defense.156 In contemporary
times, to what extent might the economic, social,
153. Miguel Urquiola, “Competition among Schools:
Traditional Public and Private Schools,” in Handbook of the
Economics of Education, ed. Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and
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or political costs of COVID-19 impact the military
profession?157 The exodus of military members and
their expertise during the post–Cold War drawdown
contributed to the initiation of the FAP, with many of
these professionals transferring to the private sector.158
Joining a commercial security firm could be an
attractive, cheaper alternative to using the military to
accomplish one’s professional mission.159 The potential
harm to the profession warrants further study.
Antiprofessionalism: The Rejection of Expertise
Stanley Fish defines antiprofessionalism as “any
attitude or argument that enforces a distinction
between professional labors on the one hand and
the identification and promotion of what is true or
valuable on the other.”160 The constructs of professions,
professionalism, and expertise are rejected and
replaced with other decision-making paradigms.
Antiprofessionalism comes in several forms, and
we address four: bureaucratization, careerism, antiintellectualism, and cognitive distancing.
The first form covered in the FAP is
bureaucratization,
in
which
the
profession’s
157. Matteo Bonotti and Steven T. Zech, Recovering Civility
during COVID-19 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 1–17.
158. Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy,” in
Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 19; and Burk,
“Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy,” in Snider and Matthews,
Future of the Army Profession, 39.
159. Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy,” in
Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, 28–30; and
Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy,” in Snider and
Matthews, Future of the Army Profession, 49–52.
160. Stanley Fish, “Anti-Professionalism,” Cardozo Law Review
7, no. 3 (1985): 645.

69

responsibilities are increasingly overtaken by
government bureaucracy, whose interests and measures
of merit are inconsistent with professional norms.161
This viewpoint contrasts with the bureaucracy of
the defense enterprise, which serves important
purposes, such as ensuring routine tasks (for example,
annual budget submissions and human resources
management functions) are performed efficiently.
Bureaucratization is when bureaucratic rules and
practices encroach upon, and potentially supplant,
professional work.162 Bureaucratization inappropriately
imposes administrative procedures or standard rules
in instances better served by professional diagnosis,
inference, and treatment. The FAP recognized the threat
uncontrolled bureaucratization poses to the profession
when imposed mandates and standards suppress
the profession’s self-policing culture or risk aversion
overtakes effectiveness.163
A related problem is when members lose their
professional calling and begin to view their service as just
another job.164 In this second form of antiprofessionalism,
the member retains the title and prestige, but the ethical
and moral underpinnings of being a professional have
eroded.165 For present purposes, we propose the term
“careerism”: the devolution of one’s response to the
call to service into the pursuit of self-interest. Instead
of performing the honorable and altruistic work of the
profession, careerists only act when convenient to do
161. Snider, “US Army as a Profession,” 14.
162. Abbott, System of Professions, 151.
163. Snider, “US Army as a Profession,” 13–16.
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so while avoiding risk to themselves or their status.166
Careerism also infects the stewardship of the profession;
in this case, meritocracy is replaced by nepotism,
cronyism, and other biases.167 Although these problems
can be caused by extrinsic factors, they are also
reflective of a poor professional climate characterized
by risk aversion or perverse incentives (for example,
ill-conceived signing or retention bonuses).
A third form of antiprofessionalism is antiintellectualism: the rejection of expertise because of
perceived elitism or views of professions as tools of
oppression.168 The FAP examined this problem because
of the military’s cultural tendencies toward action,
which, according to Dixon, leads military personnel
to make decisions emotionally rather than rationally.
Speed and decisiveness become revered, but they
represent the antithesis of developing the necessary
cognitive skills to apply professional knowledge
properly.169 Also, the archetype of the professional—
an educated, trained, and dedicated expert—is a
target of antiprofessionalism under the pretense all
professionals are products of supposed upper-class
elites and their institutional structures.170 In this view,
even professionals from modest or disadvantaged
backgrounds are, upon achieving professional
certification, allegedly infected with naked selfinterest and concerned only with acquiring power and
dominance and the desire to treat ordinary citizens
166. Fish, “Anti-Professionalism,” 648.
167. Hajjar and Ender, “McDonaldization”; and Watkins and
Cohen, “In Their Own Words.”
168. Matthews, “Anti-Intellectualism.”
169. Dixon, On the Psychology, 175–76.
170. Fish, “Anti-Professionalism.”
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with contempt.171 For the military, such views manifest
in civilian leaders who do not necessarily reject
military advice out of disagreement with its contents,
but repudiate the need for it and instead demand
compliance, as though this were tantamount to a high
degree of discipline.172
A fourth form of antiprofessionalism gained
strength with the gaming technologies of the
2010s: cognitive distancing, in which the societal
understanding of a profession becomes utterly, perhaps
intentionally, detached from reality. One can argue
cognitive distancing has a long history, such as war
being romanticized for centuries through legends,
songs, and poems.173 The American Civil War and the
horrific photographic images of its battlefields shattered
these perceptions and brought the realities of war
to public consciousness. This perspective remained
through the Cold War, as the possibilities of mutual
nuclear exchange drove a US civil defense program
that inculcated the need for grassroots preparations

171. Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (Titusville, NJ:
Hopewell, 1963), 41–43.
172. William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role
of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,” Parameters 45, no. 3
(2015): 4; and Risa Brooks, Jim Golby, and Heidi A. Urben,
“Crisis of Command: America’s Broken Civil-Military
Relationship Imperils National Security,” Foreign Affairs 100,
no. 3 (May/June 2021).
173. Simon Bainbridge, “Romanticism and War,” Oxford
Handbooks Online, 2018, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com
/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935338.001.0001/oxford
hb-9780199935338-e-111?print=pdf.
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in case the worst happened, thereby potentially
saving millions of lives.174
The trend may be reversing. Video games like
Call of Duty allow players to immerse themselves in a
fictional warlike environment. These games do not
have or reinforce professional values and norms. The
laws of armed combat are substituted by gaming rules
that allow players to do mostly anything they wish
without physical, emotional, mental, or ethical risk.
On the one hand, the Army has embraced gaming to
reach potential recruits. On the other hand, whether
playing these games or using modeling and simulation
adequately prepares individuals to face a real combat
situation or even a rigorous training environment
remains unanswered.175
The questions raised are: To what extent does the
societal rejection of professions and professionals
impact the military and its seminal institutions, such
as PME, certifications, expert knowledge, and ethics?
In particular, to what extent are the contemporary
problems of deprofessionalism and antiprofessionalism
threats to civil-military norms and effective civilian
oversight of the military?

174. Net Evaluation Subcommittee, 1963 Report of the Net
Evaluation Subcommittee (Washington, DC: National Security
Council, 1963), 27.
175. Scott N. Pomaniuk and Tobias Burgers, “How the US
Military Is Using ‘Violent, Chaotic, Beautiful’ Video Games to Train
Soldiers,” Conversation, March 7, 2017, https://theconversation
.com/how-the-us-military-is-using-violent-chaotic-beautiful
-video-games-to-train-soldiers-73826.

73

MAPPING MILITARY EXPERTISE
A third area in requiring more research is the set of
jurisdictions of the military profession, which need to
be updated. The FAP was primarily concerned with the
Army, and the responsibilities of the Joint community
and defense enterprise do not necessarily scale up
from the service level. A map is a good metaphor for
the analysis of the conceptional elements of professional
expertise and the jurisdictions within which expert
work is applied. We can increase or decrease the scale to
gain fidelity at various levels, from society to groups of
professionals, organizations, and individuals.
The primary organizing principle for the armed
forces is the use of organized violence against other
foreign and domestic armed forces that threaten the
security of the republic. Ideally, capable armed forces
deter violent challengers and hence prevent armed
conflict. The traditional conception of the primary role
of the armed forces in the current era is to counter the
organized violence of other states or nonstate actors
that pose threats to the US homeland, population, or
resources and those of its allies and partners.
The US military profession has a lot of expertise on
the use of coercive, potentially violent force to attain
society’s security. But to serve society effectively, the
expertise has to be embedded within organizations
that apply it. Historically, the concept of the “profession
of arms” captured the centrality of arms or weaponry
to the profession’s contributions. Merely managing
violence in battle is insufficient. The instrumental
employment of disciplined, organized violence is the
primary and unique expertise of military professionals;
however, the responsible employment of arms requires
expertise in four domains, such that military-technical
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expertise (first domain) be complemented by moralethical (second domain), social-political (third domain),
and human development (fourth domain) expertise.176
The latter three represent professional communities
that extend beyond the military. Thus, the military can
borrow this expertise and then modify it for military
use or simply reference it when needed. In turn, the
military can generate knowledge in these fields and
share them with the external communities of practice.
The natural focus for the FAP was the Army, with
Lacquement developing the constructs of knowledge
domains. For each of the four domains, he identified
their major subdomains (for example, leadership and
education under human development and resource
acquisition and management under political-cultural)
and the cohorts of personnel best suited for the
tasks (for example, military personnel, civilians, or
a mix of the two). He also clarified jurisdictions of
practice between the Army and other services and
government agencies (for example, the Army had “full”
jurisdictional control over offensive land operations, but
it was “subordinated” to other agencies’ jurisdictions in
counterdrug operations). See table 1 for a draft map of
the military profession’s expert knowledge.177 The table
is a slightly modified version of the Army-focused map
in chapter 9 of the second edition of the FAP.

176.
177.

Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 221–22.
Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 219.
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Table 1. Map of the military profession’s expert knowledge

Ia

Expertise Applicability
and Priority
Character of expertise

Service
Primacy

II

Services
Share Unique
Experience

Services
Adapt Civilian
Professional
Expertise
Core support

Acquired

Borrowed

Services and society

Contract in
from society

Contract out
to society

Developmental responsibility

Services

Military

Society with military component

Society with military
quality control

Society

Certification

Services

Military

Services

Services and society

Society

Leadership of human
organizations in application of
coercive force

X (domainspecific warfare)

X (general warfare)

Combat (for example, land [for
the Army])

X

Combat support

X

Joint operations

X

Combined operations

X

Administration/logistics

X

Engineering and science

X
X
X

X

X

Human behavior

X

Physical fitness

X

Education

X

Combat medicine

X
X

Social work

X

Military ethics

X

X

Character development

X

X

Legal

X

Servicemember spirituality

X

Advice on behalf of and
representation of the
profession

X

Military governance

X

X

Political negotiation

X

Diplomacy (attaché)

X

Resource acquisition and
management

Other

Services
Hire Civilian
Professionals

Core

Family medicine

Political-Cultural
Expert Knowledge

Services May
Adopt Civilian
Professional
Expertise or
Hire Civilian
Professionals

Military exclusive

Leadership

Moral-Ethical
Expert Knowledge

IV

Core

Information technology

Human Development
Expert Knowledge

III

Service exclusive

How acquired

Military-Technical
Knowledge

Ib

X
X

Basic research

X
X
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Because the FAP focused on only one segment of
the defense enterprise—the Army—the picture was
incomplete. The Army may claim primacy over offensive
land operations, but the same knowledge is also applied
by enterprise-level experts (including serving Army
professionals) in conducting strategic planning and
resource allocation necessary for the Army to develop
the force capable of conducting these operations. Some
Army jurisdictional claims were identified as “shared”
(for example, security assistance), but identifying with
whom, how, and when is important. Some jurisdictions
may be shared equally among the services under
a defense proponent (for example, communication
support). Others may see designated service proponents
assigned on a contingency basis (for example, Joint
leadership). Still others may invoke a default service
proponent who yields only by exception (for example,
offensive and defensive land operations, which, during
the 2000s, were also conducted by the Marine Corps).
We propose an architecture for mapping military
expertise across the defense enterprise. The architecture
accounts for four organizational layers—defense, Joint,
service, and intraservice—roughly corresponding to
the DoD and the civilian secretariats of the Department
of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
Department of the Air Force; the Joint community,
including the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands;
the armed services themselves (the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force) comprising
the three military professional domains of ground,
maritime, and aerospace; and the major subordinate
elements of the services (for example, components,
branches, communities, and major commands). From
this architecture, the relationships among formal
jurisdictional claims established in law, statute,
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regulation, or decree and the informal domains of
communities of practice will be presented. The section
will conclude with a discussion on whether each of the
layers constitutes a fully formed profession.
Four Echelons of Professional Work
Questioning whether the echelons of defense, Joint,
service, and everything internal to the services are
equally necessary echelons is beyond our present scope.
Each nation organizes its armed forces differently, but,
in general terms, the differences stem from what is
omitted through lack of need. A landlocked nation likely
does not have a navy unless it has an extensive need for
a riverine force. Some nations effectively merge their
defense and Joint establishments, or their Joint construct
is dominated by a single service (often an army) because
of the considerably smaller size of the other services.
Still, the division of labor performed at the defense (or
ministry), Joint or interservice, service, and intraservice
levels is consistent enough for extant purposes.
The topmost echelon is the defense enterprise, a
“systematically purposeful activity” that provides
defense for the nation by generating and sustaining
the capabilities and capacities needed for its mission.178
In practice, the defense enterprise is a political-military
activity whose purpose is to generate and sustain
capability to meet national security requirements
under authorities established by elected and politically
appointed civilian leaders.179
178. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “enterprise (n.),” accessed
October
26,
2021,
https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/enterprise.
179. Galvin, “Defense Enterprise,” 16.
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The organization of the defense enterprise layer is
more than just the Office of the Secretary of Defense.180
This layer also includes the service secretariats
and the various organizations outside the services,
including defense agencies, defense field activities,
and other offices that exercise direct oversight over the
military professions or translate national assets into
military capabilities. In the United States, the defense
enterprise also includes nonfederal entities, such as
state government bureaus that oversee the respective
National Guards and various entities that could be
activated in the event of national mobilization, such as
agencies within the National Response Framework and
the defense industrial base.181 For present purposes,
however, the focus will be on the defense and service
secretariats and the various defense-level agencies
and activities.
Below the defense enterprise is the Joint layer, which
is the primary interservice conduit. The Joint layer
represents the interdependence of uniformed military
expertise in the use or threat of violence and subsumes
service professional expertise and jurisdictions in much
the same way military services subsume the constituent
professional elements (such as branches, communities,
and specialties) they comprise. The Joint echelon is
the primary integrator of the military professions for
the conversion of national strategic direction into the
conduct of military campaigns. On the one hand, the
Joint echelon is the interservice extension of the military
professions themselves, integrating offensive land, air,
ground, cyber, and space operations into Joint offensive
operations. To accomplish this mission, the Joint
180.
181.

Galvin, “Defense Enterprise,” 16.
Galvin, “Defense Enterprise,” 17.
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echelon must be postured to adjudicate conflicting and
underlapping jurisdictional claims of the services.
The heart of the military profession beats at the
service level. The service echelon is the primary
organizing construct for the three professions of
ground, maritime, and aerospace. The professional
tasks associated with this echelon are oriented first
on combat operations, both offensive and defensive,
in the warfighting domain or domains that reflect
the jurisdictional claims of the service. Also included
are other military operational tasks, such as
stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland
defense and security, though each service prioritizes
them differently.
The intraservice level is where services divide
their professional work across communities, branches,
functional areas, and other organizational structures
in support of the services’ tasks. In the Army, these
include combat arms branches, such as infantry,
armor, and field artillery; combat support branches,
such as intelligence, engineering, signal, and military
police; combat service support branches, such as the
logistics and sustainment community, medical service,
chaplains, and judge advocates; and functional areas
or groups of technical experts separately managed
like branches, such as public affairs, operations
research and systems analysis, nuclear systems, and
force management.
These intraservice groups are communities of
practice. Members perform distinct professional tasks
that potentially draw from discrete bodies of expert
knowledge outside their respective services. These
members’ work is in support of the services’ assigned
professional tasks, not in competition with them. These
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members’ contributions to their respective services
are through collaboration, cooperation, learning, and
boundary spanning. Though these members may
exercise jurisdictional claims comprising a subset of
those claimed by the service, the service expects them
to avoid unduly interfering with other communities’
fulfilling of their roles.
Mapping Jurisdictions of Practice
The first step in our analysis is to establish the
general division of labor for the overall conduct of the
military’s professional tasks and the requisite expertise
to perform them. For the sake of simplicity, we will use
the four jurisdictions listed in the second edition of the
FAP because they apply to all of the services: (1) major
combat operations; (2) stability operations; (3) strategic
deterrence; and (4) homeland defense and security. We
will also use the four general domains of expertise in
the FAP: (1) military-technical; (2) human development;
(3) moral-ethical; and (4) political-cultural.182
The Defense Enterprise Layer
We begin with the professional responsibilities of
the defense enterprise layer in enabling (and sometimes
conducting) tasks that foster the abilities of the
military professions to sustain their four jurisdictional
claims and conduct their professional work. The first
responsibility is the receipt of national policies and
strategies and developing and implementing defense
policies, strategies, and plans. These instruments set
strategic direction for the enterprise on matters such as
the prioritization of threats and where capabilities are
182.

Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 227.
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needed to deter or confront them. These instruments
also establish guidance and direction for enterprise
activities below the level of war. Enterprise leaders
require expertise that is predominantly politicalcultural, especially for communication, with militarytechnical in support. In effect, to establish suitable and
feasible policies and strategies, enterprise leaders must
exercise skills and knowledge in the general principles
and processes of policy and strategy development.
Enterprise leaders incorporate extant technical
knowledge from the military professions to ensure
the products provide clear guidance and direction the
services need for accomplishing their own tasks.
An example is the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS), which identifies a prioritized list of threats
and threat conditions (for example, “a resilient, but
weakening, post-WWII international order” and
“the homeland is no longer a sanctuary”) as well as
challenges to the United States’ military advantage. The
NDS establishes 11 objectives for the DoD and describes
a strategic approach that includes requirements for
building more lethal capabilities, strengthening existing
partnerships while pursuing new ones, and reforming
the department’s business practices in response
to budgetary pressures and the need for greater
innovation.183 The Army subsequently published
The Army Strategy 2018, which incorporated the
guidance, established a vision or end state to be achieved
in 10 years, and established ways and means for
meeting the vision while driving future budget
requests.184 Importantly, The Army Strategy 2018
identified active and emerging weapons systems and
183. Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2–5.
184. Mark A. Milley and Mark T. Esper, The Army Strategy
2018 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018).
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other programs essential to meeting the vision and
satisfying the NDS. These products reflect professional
work, in that abstract knowledge of strategy, planning,
and programming was employed to diagnose the
environment, exercising inferences about higher
guidance, competing interests, and limited resources
and communicating the treatment—clear strategies that
allowed some flexibility.185
The second responsibility of the enterprise is
the acquisition, distribution, and stewardship of
defense resources. Although in the US system, the
services are directly involved in this task because of
the congressional authorization and appropriation
process, the ultimate responsibility for consolidating
and harmonizing the requests for funds and
advocating for the requests in support of the president’s
budget is among the defense enterprise leadership
within the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.186
Enterprise leaders rely on combinations of politicalcultural, moral-ethical, and military-technical expertise.
Political-cultural expertise is required for engaging
with key national stakeholders such as Congress and
executive branch agencies (for example, the Office of
Management and Budget). Defense leaders propose
plans, programs, and budgets to satisfy national
strategies, set resourcing priorities and strategies
across the services, establish and implement systems
of accountability for the expenditure of resources,
and report back to stakeholders to demonstrate

185. Milley and Esper, Army Strategy 2018, 7.
186. JCS, Resource Management, JP 3-80 (Washington, DC: JCS,
January 11, 2016), I-1–I-2.
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public resources are being used appropriately.187
Moral-ethical expertise helps leaders ensure compliance
with established federal legal requirements and ethical
norms.188 Military-technical knowledge helps ensure the
distribution of resources is appropriate, well informed,
and executable while minimizing or mitigating risk.189
The execution of these responsibilities also involves
professional work, particularly in the design and
use of associated decision support processes and
systems. The primary system used in the US defense
enterprise is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution system. Designed in the 1960s, this
system provides mechanisms for the enterprise to
determine its funding requirements for all of its
activities, including sustaining readiness, modernizing
the force, and providing for the proper compensation
and well-being of its members (that is, those serving in
the active or reserve component, retirees, and veterans).
Each program is different and requires leaders to
exercise professional judgment in determining the
program’s efficacy and resourcing requirements
over time. Expertise in finance, accounting, resource
management, acquisition, and many other areas aids
in the aggregation and prioritization of these program
requirements.190 The goal is allocative efficiency, such
187. US Army Force Management School, Department of
Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE)
Process/Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) Process: An Executive Primer (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army
Force Management School, 2010).
188. Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 222.
189. Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 222.
190. Louis G. Yuengert, ed., How the Army Runs 2019–2020:
A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College, 2020).
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that programs receive adequate funding but not
excessive funding, which would incur waste.191
The third responsibility of the defense enterprise
is governance of the enterprise. Governance includes
matters of organizational design and strategic
leadership. These matters reflect the internal
policies and strategies of the enterprise, including
determining whether tasks will be delegated to the
services, entrusted to the fourth estate, or retained
within enterprise leadership. For example, as of
2021, the Office of the Secretary of Defense includes
undersecretaries for policy, comptroller, personnel and
readiness, intelligence, acquisition and sustainment,
and research and engineering. Each undersecretary has
assistant secretaries focused on various subdomains.
The office has undergone numerous changes since
its establishment in 1947, reflecting the enterprise’s
assessment of the matters that require direct executive
leadership and oversight at any given time.192
Meanwhile, each military department secretariat selforganizes based on the needs of the service secretaries.
Governing the enterprise involves professional
work associated with navigating persistent, paradoxical
tensions that often require pragmatic, targeted solutions
that must be continuously reassessed. Leadership
tasks often include diagnosing problems related to
the exigencies of a complex strategic environment,
191. Stephen Aldridge, Angus Hawkins, and Cody Xuereb,
“Improving Public Sector Efficiency to Deliver a Smarter
State,” Civil Service Quarterly (blog), January 25, 2016,
https://quarterly.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/25/improving-public
-sector-efficiency-to-deliver-a-smarter-state/.
192. Historical Office, Department of Defense Key Officials:
September 1947–October 2021 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2021).
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the emergence of mismatches between strategies
and resources, and the need to sustain productive
relationships with stakeholders (such as Congress and
the White House) and the public.
Organizational scholars have presented taxonomies
of large-organization paradoxical tensions the defense
enterprise routinely faces. Tensions are organized into
several general types, but we only present two here as
illustrations.193 One tension is between centralization
for efficiency and control and decentralization for
effectiveness and flexibility; this tension can appear
in policy discussions and planning. The following
questions are representative of this tension.
•

•

Is developing blanket regulations that encompass
the whole enterprise preferable to delegating this
responsibility to the services or local commanders
and leaders? This tension is often involved in matters
of personnel and finance.
Is centralizing responsibilities at a defense agency
for the sake of efficiency preferable to decentralizing
the responsibilities among the services for the sake
of flexibility? Combat support functions like signal,
intelligence, medicine, and logistics are structured
as a mix at defense agencies with broad
responsibilities and service-level organizations that
satisfy specific, service-oriented requirements.

Consider the following examples. One is the
development of the Joint Strike Fighter, which was
193. Thomas P. Galvin and Charles D. Allen, “The
Challenge of the Paradoxical Vision: Innovating Where
No Solution Seems Possible,” Military Review February
2016 Online Exclusive Article, February 5, 2016, https://
www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review
/Online-Exclusive/2016-Online-Exclusive-Articles
/Paradoxical-Vision/.
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implemented as a holistic, Joint program with servicespecific variants rather than defaulting to the services,
which pursue separate acquisition efforts. Managing a
single, large program initially appeared more promising
and cost-effective compared to the services pursuing
independent and redundant programs. Thus, the Joint
Strike Fighter program was viewed as a model for
future Joint programs.194 As the costs of implementing
the program skyrocketed and problems arose in
managing all the proposed service variants, critics
questioned whether the idea of a centralized Joint
program was fundamentally flawed.195 Another
example is an enterprise-wide migration to centralize
the information technology architecture and consolidate
services, such as help desks, to better manage workflows
and track systemic computer and software problems
across the network.196 Network consolidation carries the
risks of: (1) the creation of bottlenecks that slow down
network traffic; and (2) catastrophic failures in the event
of security breaches, especially from insider threats.197
In both cases, today’s dynamic and competitive
194. Jeremiah Gerstler, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program,
RL30563 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
May 27, 2020), 1–2.
195. Mark A. Lorell et al., Do Joint Fighter Programs Save
Money? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 37–39.
196. Kimberly Underwood, “DISA’s Fourth Estate Network
Optimization Is on Track,” SIGNAL, July 29, 2020, https://www
.afcea.org/content/disa%E2%80%99s-fourth-estate-network
-optimization-track; and Office of the Army Chief Information
Officer, Army Network Campaign Plan 2020 & Beyond (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 15.
197. Brien Posey, “Network Consolidation and Virtualization
Solve Management Issues,” SearchServerVirtualization.com,
December 15, 2020, https://searchservervirtualization.techtarget
.com/tip/Network-consolidation-and-virtualization-solve
-management-problems.
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environment means the vulnerabilities of centralizing
may be exploited in such a way decentralization
becomes the best mitigation strategy.
A second persistent tension is continuity versus
change. For enterprise leaders, this tension represents
a significant challenge because stakeholders—both
legislative and executive—change regularly, and
defense leaders are continuously receiving new political
appointees charged with aligning the defense enterprise
with the new administration’s policies and priorities.
Leaders must assess what to change to balance
alignment with emerging policy while mitigating the
risk of disrupting ongoing activities.
The optimal way to implement change is also a
matter of professional judgment. For example, due
to intensifying budget constraints and changes in
service strategies, the Army instituted Night Court, a
program review panel chartered to realign the budget
by canceling unneeded programs to reinvest in new
priorities.198 Although the then-secretary of the Army
expressed satisfaction with the results and similar
approaches being adopted by other services, the
move was disruptive to the federal budgetary process
and Congress’s ability to analyze the impacts of
service proposals.199
Although these three responsibilities—developing
and implementing defense policies, strategies, and
198. Thomas Brading, “Back in Session: ‘Night Court’
Reinvesting More Funds for Modernization Goals,” US Army,
January 17, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/231719/back
_in_session_night_court_reinvesting_more_funds_for
_modernization_goals.
199. “Army’s Night Court Could Be Model for DoD,”
Association of the US Army, February 22, 2021, https://www
.ausa.org/news/armys-night-court-could-be-model-dod.
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plans; acquiring, distributing, and stewarding defense
resources; and providing governance of the enterprise—
are identified as professional in character, this
recognition does not necessarily establish the defense
enterprise layer as being a profession in the same
fashion as a service. In particular, the previous analysis
stops short of equating the three major functions of
implementing policies, distributing resources, and
providing governance as jurisdictional claims. Further,
though having the defense enterprise layer to help the
military professions effectively and efficiently conduct
combat operations is arguably helpful, it is theoretically
not necessary. The Army could, under certain
conditions, conduct major combat operations on its
own through the use of a professionalized general staff
construct that performs similar tasks to those of the
defense enterprise for strategies, planning, programs,
and interactions with the other military professions.
Creating the enterprise layer was ultimately a choice—a
justifiable choice, but a choice nonetheless. Thus, we will
label discussion of the enterprise as a profession as an
area that requires further research.
The Joint Layer
Authors who contributed to the FAP proposed a
distinct US Joint military profession exists and stated it
has important work in all four jurisdictions claimed by
the services.200 With the exception of stability operations,
the Joint layer provides unique expertise for the use
of coercive force for which it could claim a settlement
of full jurisdictional control on behalf of US society.
Within the US military profession, grouping constituent
elements by domain emphasizes expertise and
200.

Snider and Peterson, “Opportunity for the Army.”
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jurisdictional claims separate from organizational
structures. For example, with the creation of the
Space Force, in the US military only the warfighting
domain of cyberspace lacks a service with primary
responsibility over it.201
At the same time, the Joint layer supports the
three domains of professional work for the defense
enterprise. The Joint responsibilities in the US Code
are those of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
(1) provide strategic direction; (2) conduct strategic
and contingency planning; (3) assess and sustain
comprehensive Joint readiness; (4) conduct Joint Force
development activities; (5) develop Joint capabilities;
and (6) exercise global military integration.202 The
alignment with the defense enterprise activities is
straightforward, but the chairman (and, therefore, the
Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands) perform
these tasks by negotiating Joint positions among
the services and mediating and reconciling gaps or
inconsistencies between service and defense enterprise
perspectives. The following discussion delves further
into how the chairman’s responsibilities translate
into the professional work of other organizations or
constitute their own unique jurisdictional claims. Each
has a Joint Staff proponent whose professionals aid in
the preparation of the various products.203
The Joint layer exercises seven strong jurisdictional
claims, with several rooted in US Code. The Joint layer
inherits the four claims of the services by virtue of its
unique establishment of a Joint Staff and Combatant
201. Kreuzer, “Cyberspace Is an Analogy.”
202. Chairman: functions, 10 U.S.C. § 153 (2010).
203. Mark A. Milley, Joint Strategic Planning System, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01E (Washington, DC:
Joint Staff, May 21, 2021), B-1–B-2.
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Commands with the missions of planning and
conducting military missions involving major combat,
stability, deterrence, or homeland defense. The Joint
layer is also granted codified responsibilities to perform
professional work as the military contribution to
civil-military relations: strategies and plans, resource
management, and governance of the organization.
The Service Layer
Analysis of the service layer begins with the
four original, jurisdictional claims from the FAP in
which each claim is subdivided into tasks. Table 2,
slightly modified from the second edition of the FAP,
shows these subclaims from a land (that is, US Army)
perspective. The table includes the extent to which these
claims are fully within the profession or shared with or
subordinated to others.204

204.

Lacquement, “Army Professional Expertise,” 227.

91

Table 2. Jurisdictions and Army expertise
Jurisdictions

Army Jurisdictional Claims
Expert knowledge
(internal)

Expert work/priority
(high, medium, or low)

OFFENSIVE LAND OPERATIONS

FULL

HIGH

Defeat/destroy the enemy decisively

FULL

HIGH

Disrupt enemy defenses/coherence

FULL

HIGH

Secure or seize terrain

FULL

HIGH

Deny enemy resources

FULL

HIGH

Fix the enemy

FULL

HIGH

Gain information

FULL

HIGH

DEFENSIVE LAND OPERATIONS

FULL

HIGH

Defeat enemy attacks

FULL

HIGH

Defend terrain (including homeland)

FULL

HIGH

Develop conditions favorable for resuming operations

FULL

HIGH

Peace operations (peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
support of diplomatic efforts)

FULL

HIGH

Foreign internal defense (includes
counterinsurgency combat)

FULL

HIGH

Security assistance

SHARED

MEDIUM

Support to insurgencies

FULL

HIGH

Combating terrorism

SHARED

HIGH

Noncombatant evacuation

SHARED

HIGH

Humanitarian and civic assistance

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Relief operations (foreign)

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Arms control

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Global situational awareness (intelligence)

SHARED

HIGH

Presence and deterrence

SHARED

HIGH

Peacetime military engagement (military-to-military
contact—exercises, training, education, visits)

SHARED

HIGH

Rapid response and preclusion

SHARED

HIGH

Deterrence information operations

SHARED

HIGH

Show of force

SHARED

HIGH

Defeat threats in forward regions

SHARED

HIGH

Defeat land threats to the homeland

FULL

HIGH

Relief operations (domestic)

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Support to domestic consequence management

ADVISORY

MEDIUM

Support to counterdrug operations

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Support to civil law enforcement

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Community assistance/emergency preparedness

SUBORDINATE

LOW

Army tasks
Major combat operations

Stability operations

Strategic deterrence (for example, deter or assure)

Homeland security
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From a conceptual standpoint, these jurisdictional
claims still hold; the differences from similar tables
in the FAP reflect only the changing character of
the strategic environment and the related ongoing
negotiations of these claims with civilian leaders
and among the military professions. For example, all
domains incorporate conceptions of major combat
operations and the meanings of offensive and defensive
operations. The professions promote mastery of the
operations within their own domains while sharing
claims with the other professions.
Aviation is one such profession. All three services
have aviation elements; however, the greatest negotiated
claims are those of the Air Force because its claims are
more global in scope and, therefore, abstract, while the
other professions are focused more on specific aviation
tasks or platforms. Only the Air Force, for example,
exercises strategic air maneuvers, whereas the Navy
and Army perform only certain forms of tactical air
maneuvers. Operationally, aerospace professionals,
predominantly from the Air Force, provide the expertise
for integrating air capabilities into Joint campaigns.205
What of the three other jurisdictions being claimed
at the Joint layer? Do they apply to the services as well?
Most definitely, and this recognition signals a marked
change in the way we are looking at the military
profession. All three constitute additional claims of
jurisdiction by the services. For example, strategy and
planning is a jurisdictional claim that preceded the FAP
but was not considered a separate claim at the time.
The logic could be described as such: Major combat
operations were the raison d’être of the services, and
205. JCS, Joint Air Operations, JP 3-30 (Washington, DC: JCS,
2019), II-1–II-28.
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developing strategies and plans was seen as supporting
activities to that purpose. The services planned in
case they had to go to war, and planning for other
purposes was peripheral. In practice, however, the
services plan for other purposes as well. The services’
roles in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution system are to develop and implement
(that is, fund) a service plan for integrating current
and future capabilities in support of the NDS and the
National Military Strategy. The services also plan as
a governance function to ensure the comprehensive
review of mission-related concerns and the availability
of courses of action to coordinate action and execute
contingencies as problems arise.
In this way, planning constitutes an independent
jurisdictional claim of the services that has been
leveraged by other US government agencies that have
an important mission to accomplish but lack planning
expertise to develop comprehensive solutions. Military
planners have helped interagency partners plan and
implement humanitarian operations; disaster relief; and
other Defense Support of Civil Authorities activities,
such as support to Operation Warp Speed, which
facilitated the development of COVID-19 vaccines.206
The same holds for the acquisition, distribution,
and stewardship of service resources. In particular, the
jurisdictional claims of the US military professions are
even stronger than those of the defense enterprise and
Joint layers because of the congressional appropriation
process, which appropriates funds primarily through
the services, not the DoD. Acquisition professionals,
206. Karen Howard and Candice Wright, Operation Warp
Speed: Accelerated COVID-19 Vaccine Development Status and
Efforts to Address Manufacturing Challenges, GAO-21-319
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2021).
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resource managers, comptrollers, human resource (that
is, talent) managers, and others synthesize militarytechnical, human development, moral-ethical, and
political-cultural knowledge in the unique context of
the military in support of, but largely independent of,
the accomplishment of the military’s core missions.207
For example, the conduct of major combat may increase
the urgency for developing a new weapon system, but,
to the program manager, this factor only contributes
to an independent diagnostic and treatment process
for determining how best to accelerate development,
production, and fielding.
The governance function is likewise a stronger
jurisdictional claim than at the defense and Joint levels,
and for similar reasons. The defense and Joint levels
perform governance at a more abstract level than
the services do. An assistant secretary may establish
a policy that family support is critical to individual
readiness, but the services fully operationalize the
policy into organizational structures, resources, and
activities. Governance is also manifest in the many
ways services demonstrate commitment to service
members and families, helping to foster readiness
and resilience so servicemembers can concentrate on
combat preparations. Yet, the effective performance of
this function avoids interfering with the core mission
of the organization. Governance must be robust,
yet not become an end unto itself, lest it become too
bureaucratic and self-serving, and an impediment
rather than a help.
For this reason, expert knowledge of a moralethical and human development nature becomes
very important. The professions view military ethics,
207.

Kappelmann, American Military Profession, 6.
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character development, laws of warfare, and the
enhancement of resilience as important. Failures
in these areas are sources of scandal and other
unprofessional behavior, as has been found in various
sexual harassment and assault scandals that arose in the
2010s, presenting challenges to the military’s espoused
values. Of course, leader and member responses to such
crises must address the problem, but they must do so
in a way that enhances the mission and avoids creating
bureaucratic or other structures that detract from, or
compete with, the mission over time.
The Intraservice or Community Layer
The community layer examines how the military
professional tasks break down into component functions
requiring separate, though interdependent, domains of
expertise. Some represent formal subdivisions, such as
Army branches or Navy communities. But we must also
consider the many informal subdivisions that emerge
through the unique skills and expertise of individual
servicemembers or demands for capabilities not resident
within the established organizational structures.
For example, in table 2, stability operations is
subdivided into peace operations, foreign internal
defense, combating terrorism, and others. Although
these subdomains may contain common tasks, they
are largely discrete and require different skills and
competencies to perform correctly and appropriately.
Although the military’s strength in strategic planning
and overall “can do,” mission-first attitude affords it a
degree of adaptability that, in the short term, can allow
it to accept any mission required, a professional force
should not operate outside its areas of expertise for
too long, particularly in environments where adaptive
adversaries can exploit knowledge and expertise gaps
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once uncovered. Consequently, each of the subordinate
entries in table 2 can constitute a community of practice,
delivering niche capabilities that may only be required
of a small part of the force, such as a specialized unit
or informal working group in a service component
command staff.
A detailed examination of communities of practice
operating within a service or the enterprise is beyond the
scope of this monograph because numerous candidates
present themselves, each uniquely different in character
and history. Instead, we will present some general
themes that explain the different sources and structures
of these communities based on the various subordinate
tasks and subdomains of expertise identified or implied
in table 2. These tasks and subdomains reflect degrees
of internal professionalization—discrete domains of
expert knowledge; discrete professional structures,
such as certifications and associations; and affirmed,
professional identities of the members—in descending
order. For identity, one’s professional self-concept is
not necessarily in competition with that of the broader
profession; rather, they reflect two facets of identity, the
relative salience of which could ebb and flow over time.
Formal
internal
subdivisions:
branches
and
communities.
Some
communities
of
practice
are clearly and unambiguously defined in the
organizational structure; these constitute the
majority. These communities include all of the
branches and functional areas within the Army (for
example, infantry, artillery, signal, intelligence, and
logistics) and the communities within the Navy (for
example, surface, submarine, and supply corps)
and the Air Force (for example, bombers, fighters,
transport, tankers, and base support). Most of
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these communities are not self-contained within a
service. Rather, they comprise professionals working
interdependently with colleagues from higher
headquarters and peer organizations.
Communications support is an excellent example
because it is provided through an extensive collection
of providers, from the Defense Information Systems
Agency and various Joint and service entities down
to tactical signal units, all of whom must work well
together to provide communication support to the
warfighter. In contrast, armor is a branch that is more
closely tied to the ground profession and is less involved
with boundary spanning.
These communities are generally the most
internally professionalized. They maintain most or
all of the following in an official capacity: centers of
excellence with dedicated organizations that sustain
community-specific, expert knowledge, including
concepts, doctrine, and lessons learned; human
resources management institutions for communityspecific education, recruitment, assignments, and career
development; force development professionals who
translate concepts and doctrine into organizational
structures and requirements; and community-specific
associations, journals, conferences, and related activities
dedicated to furthering knowledge and its application.
The strength of the community is measured in part by
its relevance to the conduct of major combat operations
or other professional tasks over which the service has
full jurisdictional claims.
Many professional tasks involve some degree of
integration between the community and the broader
military context. For example, professional education
and training integrates general knowledge of major
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combat operations with the technical knowledge
of the community. This integration improves
collaboration across communities of practice because
all servicemembers operate under a shared context. In
addition, this integration reinforces service and Joint
professional identities and improves interoperability.
Moreover, for the communities that are connected
to professions outside the defense enterprise, like
information technology, these internal institutions
ensure the community of practice does not divorce itself
from the military mission.
Formal internal components of external communities.
The previous paragraphs discussed communities
of practice that are mostly internal to the military;
however, not all of them are. Some view most of the
expertise and its top professional institutions (for
example, other government agencies) as residing
outside the defense enterprise. This viewpoint could
create more tension between the military profession
and its community of practice. Military intelligence
is an example. The community provides intelligence
support to the Joint Force commander, and military
intelligence units perform critical tasks associated
with each of the service’s primary warfighting
jurisdictions. The military community, however, is
also a conduit to the broader intelligence community
that provides important products the military
component cannot. In effect, the internal community
of practice of intelligence is both a service provider
to the commander and a customer or client of the
broader intelligence enterprise. Other examples
may include space operations, the Army scientist
community, modeling and simulations, the special
branches (chaplain, judge advocate, and medical), and
nuclear operations.
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A key difference from other communities, like
infantry and armor, is the extent to which knowledge
sustainment, professional work, and professional
institutions and associations reside outside the defense
enterprise. Schools, certifications, and other institutions
may be external to the military, and members may
struggle more with balancing their military professional
identities with those of their community. In particular,
education and certification requirements could be at
odds. For example, military doctors face competing
demands to participate in PME while sustaining
their medical credentials. For members of the smaller
communities, like nuclear operations, being a military
member may be disadvantageous for membership in
the broader profession if the members face too many
barriers to maintaining their external credentials due to
military demands.
Formal functions within organizational structures.
Though the two categories previously discussed align
with formal communities of practice with discrete
structures, other communities of practice emerge
from more duty-specific requirements. Most military
organizations have staff elements that perform
common professional tasks, such as managing current
operations, plans, and training, where members are
immaterial to the branch. Other organizations have
common staff elements that draw expert knowledge
from a community of practice, but their incumbent
members may not be part of the community.
For example, Army unit S-1/G-1s, S-4/G-4s, and
maintenance officers may be members of the unit’s
branch rather than being assigned from the adjutant
general, quartermaster, or ordnance corps.
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Other positions that may be community-immaterial
include professional military educators, legislative
affairs personnel, and country desk officers in the
Combatant Commands. Some of these communities
have a central domain of knowledge to draw from
and may even be closely associated with a branch
(for example, S-4s and quartermasters), but other
communities may be more closely associated with a
special organization (for example, legislative affairs
or the Office of the Chief Legislative Liaison). In these
cases, the community of practice is more volatile and
may focus its sustainment of knowledge locally to
ensure transient members are brought up to
speed quickly.
These communities of practice have vulnerabilities.
Internal stratification within the community may be
significant, with the core of the community comprising
longer-term specialists and technical experts. Though
this high degree of internal stratification could
foster the development and sustainment of knowledge,
it could also marginalize the perspectives of transient
members or treat unusual or lower-level tactical
contexts as less interesting or important. Transient
members may also not adopt the community identity
because the duties may be collateral to the members’
career progression or long-term professional goals.
The communities of practice as a whole could also
be marginalized if the domain of professional work
is (perhaps wrongly) perceived by service or Joint
leaders as peripheral to the core mission of major
combat operations.
Informal communities of practice comprising individual
expertise. Whereas the three communities previously
discussed derive from formal structures within the
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enterprise, informal communities of practice are largely
based on individual skills, knowledge, and interests.
These communities are the least professionalized,
although the process of professionalization may be
underway. Two cases may be considered. The first is
individuals specializing in mission areas the military
shares with or subordinates to other experts in
accordance with table 2. An example is counterdrug
operations under the jurisdiction of homeland
security. The expertise resides outside the defense
enterprise (within the Department of Homeland
Security, particularly the US Coast Guard and US
Customs and Border Protection), but some Combatant
Commands and other organizations have a vested
interest in tapping into counterdrug expertise (for
example, US Southern Command as a result of its
membership in Joint Interagency Task Force South).
These communities could include advisers from or
connections with other US government agencies. The
communities could also include internal members
who accumulate expertise and experience through
exposure to counterdrug operations, such as those of
Joint Interagency Task Force South, which may identify
them as counterdrug experts and influence their
future assignments. Community members assume
an implicit responsibility to stay connected, share
relevant expertise, and ensure their knowledge remains
applicable to the profession’s primary jurisdictions.
The second case is the informal network in which
emerging requirements for expert knowledge in
support of the profession are becoming apparent but
have not been codified in the organizational structure.
A useful historical example is cybersecurity, which
began as a niche expertise area in the information
technology field but eventually grew into a separate
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structure (for example, US Cyber Command).208 In their
infancy, these communities form out of a recognized
need for expertise, possibly through the hiring
or onboarding of external experts with special
skills or knowledge. Depending on the context
and use of the knowledge, these communities may
evolve into enduring sources of expertise in their
respective organizations and pursue some degree of
professionalization for stability. But, absent a formal
structure, these communities are vulnerable and
subject to potential elimination or outsourcing.
IMPLICATIONS
The above mapping of professional expertise
constitutes a more robust model of how, when, and
where military professionals perform their work. The
map captures more completely the continuous vertical
and horizontal competition over jurisdictional claims
within the enterprise structure. The map also accounts
for the full professionalization process and recognizes
the military’s demands for expertise often expand into
domains traditionally outside the military purview.
The following paragraphs discuss areas that are ripe for
future research.
First, why, how, and when should the jurisdictional
claims in table 2 change? Much of the FAP’s focus
was on defending the military’s jurisdictional claims
against potential attack or reaffirming the military’s
identity in its core tasks. But these claims are dynamic,
and the emergence of cyber, space, and other domains
of expertise has implications for the areas in which the
military requires expertise. Moreover, some domains
208. “Our History,” US Cyber Command, n.d., https://
www.cybercom.mil/About/History/.
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identified as “shared” or “subordinate” may need to
become “full” or vice versa. Other domains may shift
their focus from the service level to the enterprise
level, and the less formal or codified domains at the
community level may need to become more formalized
and constitute new jurisdictional claims. Fears of
mission creep can cause leaders to avoid taking
on new missions, even when the profession would
benefit. Factors contributing to informed decisions
about changes to jurisdictional claims would be useful.
The second area is a corollary to the first: Why,
how, and when should the military relinquish a
jurisdictional claim? Relinquishing a jurisdictional
claim is tantamount to giving up a mission or
outsourcing it entirely. Although relinquishing a
jurisdictional claim is rarely done in practice, this
discussion is an ongoing civil-military one about the
tasks the military should stop performing because
they detract from preparations for major combat
operations. Frequently targeted tasks are security
assistance, humanitarian assistance, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities, and support to law enforcement.
Though these tasks are designated as low priority
in table 2, they surface as requirements in times
of domestic crisis.209 The military is often the only
institution postured for these types of missions, which
would make divesting the capabilities difficult. The
abrupt cutting of missions is also fraught with risk.
Senior leaders would benefit from further study into
how best to analyze, identify, approve, and implement
changes to jurisdictional claims and to whom to assign
this task.
209. Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement, RL33557 (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1, 15.
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The third area of research is to conceptualize
table 2 for the enterprise-level tasks and how they
promulgate through other layers. Research should
go beyond defining them and determine when they
enhance or constrain professional work performed at
the Joint, service, and community levels.
Finally, the proposed additional jurisdictional
claims at the defense enterprise layer could be further
explored to determine how and to what extent the
public sector bureaucracy overtakes or unduly
constrains the military’s professional work. The
professional work of defense bureaucrats, which is
important for ensuring the adequate flow of resources
and development of military capabilities, involves
complex decision making and management of risk.
The FAP warns of the obedient form of bureaucracy
that inhibits the abilities of military professionals
to perform professional work. Because the military
profession is naturally protective of its professional
identity, intrusion may be met with negative reaction.
Further research is needed to better understand the
character of the alleged intrusion. Is the intrusion
an appropriate response to a military failing? Is the
intrusion characteristic of ordinary claims of jurisdiction
between the military and its civilian leadership? Or is
the intrusion indeed an undue constraint imposed for
nonprofessional reasons?
WAY FORWARD: PROJECT OUTLINE
Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, Lloyd J. Matthews, et
al. did a masterful job building a team and leading it
to apply Abbott’s insights into the Army in a period
of major change following the end of the Cold War
and the initial post-9/11 response to global terrorism
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threats. These scholars’ framework for the future of
the Army profession should be expanded to the entire
US military.
To improve the foundations of the US military
profession, the project we propose should accomplish
four main objectives. First, the project should
update the analysis of the military profession to
account for changes that have occurred in the past
15 years. The contemporary challenges facing the
profession are daunting, but so too have been the
challenges throughout the US military’s history. Some
challenges are enduring, such as keeping abreast
of the ever-changing character of war. Others are
peculiar to contemporary times, such as the growing
antiprofessionalism movement in society. This
monograph has raised multiple questions about the
stewardship of the profession that deserve exploration.
Second, the project should extend the Abbott/
Snider model beyond the Army to a better
understanding of the US military profession as a
whole, including placing its Joint character on the
pillars of service and domain-specific expertise.
Extending the model to include Wenger’s communities
of practice makes examining the many tasks the
military is asked to do, from running a three-millionperson defense enterprise to a squad on the battlefield,
easier. The extended model proposed here should
help the stewards of the profession differentiate
between the expertise that is important and necessary
and the expertise that is not and is therefore eligible
for outsourcing to other entities.
Third, the extended model allows for a reexamination
of the professional roles and responsibilities of the
various cohorts: military members, civilians, retirees,
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and veterans. The extended Abbott/Snider/Wenger
framework helps explain what we, the authors, are asking
professionals of all cohorts to do and not do as stewards
of the profession.
Finally, and most importantly, the project should
strive to sustain society’s trust in the US military
profession. The US armed forces have enjoyed a high
level of trust from society for several decades, but this
support appears to have changed in the postpandemic
environment. Politicization of the military; recurring
professional crises, such as sexual harassment and
assault; and the possible shift from overseas operations
to domestic concerns may mean the military will face
greater scrutiny than it has in recent years. Society
would be less likely to forgive errors. The military could
become unpopular with the public and experience
greater difficulties recruiting volunteers, which would
impact readiness. Preserving the professional identity
of the force remains a critical responsibility vested in
leaders at all levels of the defense enterprise.
The other side of the military-social relationship
has not been adequately explored. What should US
society grant the US military profession in return?
The US military can only be as professional as society
permits. Militaries, whether they are composed of
volunteers or draftees, depend on their societies for
personnel who are ready and willing to serve, the
resources necessary for mission readiness, and the will
to fight when called upon for the defense of the nation
and its interests. At the turn of the twenty-first century,
the very ideas of professions and professionalism have
been called into question, as seen in the COVID-19
pandemic with the controversies over law enforcement
and public health. Society’s role in conferring the
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designation of “profession” should not be taken
for granted.
The overall goal of this project is to provide a
framework that supports continuous and healthy
negotiations between US society—citizens as well
as executive and legislative representatives—and its
military professionals. This project does not provide
a permanent answer to what the US military
profession is, what it does, and who decides; however,
it frames how to answer questions about the character
of national security challenges and the role military
professionals play (including in conjunction with
nonmilitary professions). The objective is to support
open and continuous dialogue about how the military
can best meet US national security goals now and in
the future.
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